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The fact that repeated interactions can allow new and more efﬁcient equilibrium
outcomes is one of game theory’s most important insights. It has been shown to
apply in a range of settings, including games with imperfect public information
about opponents’ actions, and games where the monitoring structure- the map
from actions to signal distributions- is itself unknown.1 It has also been shown
in games with private information about the payoff functions.2 This paper studies
games with the combination of these features: both the monitoring structure and
the payoff functions can depend on an unknown state variable, and the players
may have initial private information about the state. This describes, for example, a
repeated partnership game where players observe group output but do not observe
each other’s effort, and each player has private information about the effect of her
effort on the probability distribution of output.
Our main goal in this paper is to understand how the information structure
of the game- meaning the combination of the monitoring structure and the initial
private information- determines the extent to which the player’s initial private in-
formation can be revealed in equilibrium. We address this question indirectly, by
computing the limit of the equilibrium payoffs when players are patient. More
speciﬁcally, we restrict attention to the perfect type-contingently public ex-post
equilibrium or PTXE (Fudenberg and Yamamoto [17]). These are ex-post equilib-
ria where each player’s strategy depends only on the realized public outcomes and
his initial private information (hence “type-contingent”) but not on the player’s
private information about his own past actions.
PTXE generalizes several solution concepts: It reduces to the PPXE of [17]
if players have no private information, the belief-free equilibria of [21] and [22]
when actions are observed,3 and the perfect public equilibrium (PPE) of Fuden-
1For repeated games with public monitoring, see Green and Porter [19], Radner [29], Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti [1,2], Fudenberg and Levine [14], Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin [15],
Athey and Bagwell [3], and Fudenberg, Levine, and Takahashi [16]. Fudenberg and Yamamoto
[17] consider games where the monitoring structure is unknown.
2See Kohlberg [27], Forges [12], Sorin [32,33], Hart [20], Aumann and Maschler [5], Cripps
and Thomas [8], Gossner and Vieille [18], Renault and Tomala [31], Wiseman [34,35], H¨ orner
and Lovo [21], and H¨ orner, Lovo, and Tomala [22] for games with private information.
3These equilibria are different than the belief-free equilibria of repeated games with private
monitoring (Piccione [28], Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki [10], Ely, H¨ orner, and Olszewski [9], Yamamoto
[36,37], and Kandori [25]), which require that players be indifferent.
1berg, Levine, and Maskin [15] (hereafter FLM) in complete-information games
with a known monitoring structure. As with ex-post equilibria more generally,
these equilibria are robust to the speciﬁcation of the players’ prior beliefs: a PTXE
for a given prior distribution is a PTXE for an arbitrary prior.4
Any PPXE of the symmetric information game (where no player has initial
private information about the state) induces a PPXE of the game where some
players do have private information: these PPXE correspond to pooling equilib-
ria of the incomplete-information game. Thus the folk theorems of [17] apply to
games with private information. However, those theorems require that the dis-
tribution of signals vary with the state in a sufﬁciently rich way (essentially so
that the state can be learned from the signals generated by some ﬁxed action pro-
ﬁle), and this is more restrictive than necessary when some players have private
information. For example, if one player knows the state, he may be able to com-
municate it to the others using a strategy that conditions on the player’s private
information. This paper takes the possibility of such implicit communication into
account, and so generates a larger set of equilibrium payoffs. In some cases, such
as the partnership games we deﬁne in Section 3, in which a player’s productivity
is private information, there often exist asymptotically efﬁcient equilibria, while
equilibrium payoffs are bounded away from efﬁciency if the players ignore their
private information.
Moreover, we can characterize the limit payoffs of PTXE with linear program-
ming techniques. Speciﬁcally, the set of limit equilibrium payoffs is the intersec-
tion of maximal half-spaces in various directions, where the direction vectors l
assign weights on each player’s payoff in each state, the maximal half-space in di-
rection l is all vectors v with l ¢v no greater than the maximum score for l, and
this score is the highest weighted sum of payoffs that can be obtained with con-
tinuation payoffs that satisfy the incentive constraints and whose weighted sum is
no higher than the sum they are supporting.
Roughly speaking, there are PTXE where players learn the state if the score
is sufﬁciently large in “cross-state” directions that give non-zero weight to two or
more states. For this to be the case, informed players must be willing to reveal
their information, and uninformed players must not “jam” the information rev-
elation of their informed opponents. A key point is that the relevant conditions
4See Bergemann and Morris [6] for a discussion of various deﬁnitions of ex-post equilibrium.
2depend on whether the informed player’s payoff in a given state is given positive
or negative weight. With a positive weight the informed player wants to reveal
the state, and our conditions imply that other players cannot prevent this; with a
negative weight the informed player might prefer to hide the state, but under our
conditions this is not possible.
We use these results to prove a folk theorem. While the exact conditions are
complicated to state, the key assumption is that for each pair of players i and j
(where possibly i = j) and each pair of states w and w0 , w, either (i) there is a
player l , i; j whose private information distinguishes w and w0, and player l can
reveal this information regardless of the actions of i and j by choosing different
actions in state w and state w0, (ii) player i or j (or both) can distinguish w and
w0 using initial private information, and the informed player is willing to reveal
this information while the other one cannot interfere, or (iii) there is an action pro-
ﬁle a (independent of the private information) that distinguishes (more formally,
“statewise identiﬁes”) w from w0. Conditions (i) and (ii) lead to a sort of “endoge-
nous learning” where players transmit their private information to the opponents,
while condition (iii) is a sort of “exogenous learning” based on the distribution of
signals at a ﬁxed action proﬁle. Note that condition (i) does not require that player
l is willing to reveal his information. This is because the condition can be used for
directions where player l’s continuation payoff has zero weight and hence is un-
constrained, and our “individual full rank” assumption ensures that there is some
speciﬁcation of the continuation payoffs that induces player l to play the speciﬁed
actions in the two states. In contrast, if no third player can distinguish the states,
then the incentives of the revealing player become relevant, as without additional
conditions it may be that any continuation payoffs that induce player i to reveal
his information must increase or decrease player j’s continuation payoff in a way
that lowers the score.
We then consider a few cases with additional structure that simpliﬁes our char-
acterization. We begin with the case where the state space has one component that
only inﬂuences payoffs and a second component that only inﬂuences the monitor-
ing structure; here we show that when the full rank conditions are satisﬁed the
limit set can be determined for each payoff function separately. Next we consider
games with a product structure, where there is a separate and independent signal
associated with each player’s action, and moreover each player knows the effect
3of his action on the signal distribution while the others do not. For example, in a
game of bilateral production and exchange, the public signal might be the quality
of a player’s output, with each player having private information about the prob-
ability that she will make a high-quality good when she exerts high effort. Here
we show that the scores for two classes of cross-state directions are high enough
to be compatible with the folk theorem, but that the scores in the remaining class
need not be. Finally, as an illustration of our characterization, we examine in de-
tail a repeated partnership example where only group output is observed, and the
state determines the productivity of player 2. We show that if player 1’s private
information reveals player 2’s productivity while 2 has no private information (i.e.
“1 knows 2’s productivity”), then the folk theorem holds in general, while if only
player 2 knows player 2’s productivity, the folk theorem can fail, and moreover the
limit equilibrium payoffs can be bounded away from efﬁciency. Intuitively, player
2 cannot be induced to reveal the state when doing so would lower his equilibrium
payoff, and this leads to a bound on the extent to which equilibria can trade off
player 2’s payoffs between the two states; in some cases this bound is so strong
that it rules out the efﬁcient outcome.
Finally, we specialize to the case of a known monitoring structure, where we
show that the set of limit equilibrium payoffs with imperfectly observed actions
is the same as in the observed-action case studied by [21] and [22] provided that
the monitoring structure satisﬁes a full-rank condition. [22] provide an equiva-
lent characterization (for observed actions) that has a much different form; each
characterization may be better suited for some applications. Our results show that
their conclusions about limit payoffs extend to imperfectly observed actions; their
work is complementary and more informative because it also explicitly constructs
equilibrium strategies. The assumption of a known monitoring structure also lets
us provide a sufﬁcient condition for the folk theorem that is easier to verify: the
key is that for every pair of states w and w0, there be at least three players whose
private information distinguishes between w and w0; [22] use this same condi-
tion to show in games with observed actions the set of ex-post perfect equilibria
is non-empty. In the case of one-sided incomplete information, we are able to
further extend and reﬁne their results; for example, we ﬁnd a simpler sufﬁcient
condition for the existence of PTXE.
42 Framework
2.1 Model
Let I = f1;¢¢¢ ;Ig be the set of players. At the beginning of the game, Nature
chooses the state of the world w from a ﬁnite set W = fw1;¢¢¢ ;wOg. Then each
player observes a private signal, which gives (possible imperfect) information
about the true state w. The set of player i’s private signals, Qi, is a partition
of W, and given the true state w 2 W, he observes a private signal qi 2 Qi that
contains w. For notational convenience, let qi(w) denote this qi, i.e., w 2 qi(w),
and let q(w) = (qi(w))i2I. Given qi 2 Qi, player i forms a prior about the true
state w, which is denoted by mi(qi) 2 4qi.
Each period, players move simultaneously, and player i 2 I chooses an action
ai from a ﬁnite set Ai.5 Given an action proﬁle a = (ai)i2I 2 A ´ £i2IAi, players
observe a public signal y from a ﬁnite set Y according to the probability function
pw(a) 2 4Y; we call the function pw the “monitoring structure.” Player i’s re-
alized payoff is uw
i (ai;y), so that her expected payoff conditional on w 2 W and
a 2 A is gw
i (a) = åy2Y pw
y (a)uw
i (ai;y); gw(a) denotes the vector of expected pay-
offs associated with action proﬁle a. If there are w0 , w such that qi(w) = qi(w0)
and uw
i (ai;y) , uw0
i (ai;y) for some ai 2 Ai and y 2Y, then we assume that player
i does not observe the realized value of ui as the game is played.6 If there are
no such w0 , w, it is immaterial whether or not ui is observed, as player i can
compute it from ai, y, and qi.7
In the inﬁnitely repeated game, players have a common discount factor d 2
(0;1). Let (at
i ;yt) be the realized pure action and observed signal in period t,
and denote player i’s private history from period one to period t ¸ 1 by ht
i =
(at
i ;yt)t
t=1. Let h0
i = / 0, and for each t ¸ 0, let Ht
i be the set of all ht
i. Likewise, a
public history up to periodt ¸1 is denoted by ht =(yt)t
t=1, and Ht denotes the set
5All of our results extend immediately to the case where Ai depends on qi:
6As we explain in the next section, the equilibria we consider remain equilibria when players
are provided with additional channels of information about the state. Thus the assumption that
players do not observe their realized payoffs has no role in the results; it allows us to generalize
past work (such as most of the references in footnote 2) that did not require players observe their
realized payoffs.
7We call this the case of known own payoffs; note that it does not imply that each player i
knows the their stage-game payoff function gw
i as that payoff is an expected value with respect to
the possibly unknown distribution pw.
5ofallht. Astrategyforplayeriisdeﬁnedtobeamappingsi :Qi£
S¥
t=0Ht
i !4Ai.
Let Si be the set of all strategies for player i, and let S = £i2ISi.
We deﬁne the feasible payoff set in a given state w to beVw ´cof(gw(a))ja2
Ag=fgw(h)jh 2D(A)g, where D(A) is the set of all probability distributions over
A,8 and we deﬁne the set of feasible payoffs of the overall game to be
V ´ £w2WVw:
Note that a feasible payoff vector v 2V may be generated using different action
distributions hw in each state w. If players observe w at the start of the game and
are very patient, then any payoff inV can be obtained by state-contingent strategy
of the inﬁnitely repeated game.
2.2 Preliminaries
Player i’s strategy si 2 Si is type-contingently public if it depends only on qi 2 Qi
and ht 2 Ht, that is, if si(qi;ht
i) = si(qi;˜ ht
i) whenever ht
i and ˜ ht
i correspond to the
same public history. A strategy proﬁle s 2 S is type-contingently public if si is
type-contingently public for each i 2 I. Given a type-contingently public strategy
proﬁle s 2 S, let sij(qi;ht) denote player i’s continuation strategy when his type is qi
and the past public history is ht, and let sj(q;ht) =(sij(qi;ht))i2I.9 This paper studies
a special class of Nash equilibria called perfect type-contingently public ex-post
equilibria or PTXE.
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy proﬁle s 2 S is a perfect type-contingently public ex-
post equilibrium (PTXE) if s is type-contingently public, and if for any w 2 W
and ht 2 Ht, sj(q(w);ht) is a Nash equilibrium of the inﬁnitely repeated game with
W = fwg.
Remark 1. PTXE is an ex-post equilibrium concept in the sense that it requires
each player’s strategy is a best response irrespective of the true value of the state.
8As in the standard case of a game with a known monitoring structure, the feasible set Vw is
both the set of feasible average discounted payoffs in the inﬁnite-horizon game when players are
sufﬁciently patient and the set of expected payoffs of the stage game that can be obtained when
players use of a public randomizing device to implement distribution h over the action proﬁles.
9Here, the word “continuation strategy” is an abuse of language, because sij(qi;ht) is not a
strategy for the entire game; it speciﬁes a play for a given type qi but not for ˜ qi , qi.
6For this reason, the set of PTXE is independent of the players’ beliefs about the
state, which makes the analysis of equilibria much simpler. The ex-post property
also implies that a PTXE for a given partition Q is also a PTXE for any ﬁner par-
tition; in particular a PTXE for the trivial partition (where players have no private
information) remains a PTXE when Q is informative. The PPXE we considered
in [17] are the same as the PTXE with the trivial partition; the point of this paper
is that ﬁner partitions on Q can support a larger set of PTXE, as in the examples
of Section 6.3, where there are efﬁcient limit PTXE but the PPXE are bounded
away from efﬁciency uniformly in d.
Remark 2. A second consequence of the ex-post nature of PTXE is that a PTXE
of the game where players do not observe their realized stage game payoffs re-
mains a PTXE if players do observe these realized payoffs and the payoffs reveal
information about w: That said, additional equilibrium outcomes could arise here
under a relaxed equilibrium deﬁnition that allowed players to condition on this
additional private information. We do not investigate that possibility in this paper.
Given a discount factor d 2 (0;1), let E(d) denote the set of PTXE payoffs,
i.e., E(d) is the set of all vectors v = (vw
i )(i;w)2I£W 2 RI£jWj such that there is a
PTXE s satisfying (1¡d)E
£
åt=1dt¡1gw
i (at)
¯
¯s;w
¤
= vw
i for all i and w. Note
that v 2 E(d) speciﬁes the equilibrium payoff for all players and all states.
Let ~ ai = (a
qi
i )qi2Qi where a
qi
i 2 4Ai for each qi 2 Qi, and let ~ a = (~ ai)i2I.
Thus~ a is an action proﬁle contingent on private information; it speciﬁes a mixed
action ai for each private signal qi of each player i. Let g(~ a) = (gw
i (aq(w)))(i;w)
denote the payoff vector of type-contingent proﬁle ~ a: If the action proﬁle a is
used independently of private information, we denote its payoff vector by g(a) =
(gw
i (a))(i;w).
By deﬁnition, any continuation strategy sjht = (sjq(w);ht)w2W of a PTXE is
also a PTXE. Thus any PTXE speciﬁes PTXE continuation play after each signal
y, where the continuation payoffs w(y) = (ww
i (y))(i;w)2I£W corresponding to this
signal specify the payoffs for every player and every state. We will write pw(a)¢
ww
i for the the expected continuation payoff at state w under action proﬁle a.
In [17], we showed that the limit of the equilibrium payoffs as d ! 1 is deter-
mined by the solutions k¤(~ a;l;d) to the following family of linear programming
problems; for each type-contingent action proﬁle ~ a, direction l 2 RI£jWj nf0g,
7and d 2 (0;1),
k¤(~ a;l;d) = max
v2RI£jWj
w:Y!RI£jWj
l ¢v subject to
(i) vw
i = (1¡d)gw
i (aq(w))+dpw(aq(w))¢ww
i (1)
for all i, w,
(ii) vw
i ¸ (1¡d)gw
i (ai;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )+dpw(ai;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )¢ww
i (2)
for all i, w, and ai 2 Ai,
(iii) l ¢v ¸ l ¢w(y) for all y 2Y.
If there is no (v;w) satisfying the constraints, we set k¤(~ a;l;d) = ¡¥; if for
every K > 0 there is (v;w) satisfying all the constraints and l ¢v > K, then let
k¤(~ a;l;d) = ¥.
Here condition (i) is the “adding-up” condition, condition (ii) is ex-post in-
centive compatibility, and condition (iii) requires that the continuation payoffs lie
in half-space corresponding to direction vector l and payoff vector v. Note that
when lw
i ,0 and lw0
j ,0 for some w ,w0, condition (iii) allows “utility transfer”
across states.
As argued in [17], the score k¤(~ a;l;d) is independent of d, so we denote it
by k¤(~ a;l). Let k¤(l) = sup~ a k(~ a;l) be the highest score attainable in direction
l for any choice of ~ a. For each l 2 RI£jWjnf0g and k 2 R, let H(l;k) = fv 2
RI£jWjjl ¢v · kg; with H(l;k) = RI£jWj for k = ¥ or l = 0, and H(l;k) = / 0 for
k = ¡¥ and l , 0. Now let
H¤(l) = H(l;k¤(l))
be the maximal half-space in direction l, and let
Q =
\
l2RI£jWj
H¤(l):
The following proposition establishes that the intersection Q of the maximal half-
spaces is equal to the limit set of PTXE payoffs as d ! 1. The proof is omitted,
as it is similar to [17], which builds on the techniques of [14].
Proposition 1. If dimQ = I£jWj, then limd!1E(d) = Q.
8Ourgoalinthispaperistousethischaracterizationtocompute limd!1E(d)in
some cases of interest. To do this we provide conditions under which the maximal
half-spaces in the various directions are “large.”
3 Examples
Before developing our general results, we provide a few examples of PTXE to
illustrate the ways that players can “learn the state” in equilibrium.
Example 1. Let I = f1;2g and W = fw1;w2g, Q1 = f(w1);(w2)g and Q2 =
f(w1;w2)g. Player 1 chooses either U or D, and player 2 chooses either L or
R. The payoffs for state w1 are in the left panel, and those for state w2 are in the
right.
L R
U 2, 2 0, 1
D 1, 0 1, 1
L R
U 1, 1 0, 1
D 1, 0 2, 2
In this example, both (U;L) and (D;R) are static ex-post equilibria.
Assume that Y = A and pw
y (a) = e if y , a. Note that the signal distribution
does not depend on the state here, so that players cannot learn the state from
state-independent actions. Instead, the efﬁcient outcome ((2;2);(2;2)) can be
approximated if player 1 reveals his private information to player 2 through his
actions. Speciﬁcally, consider the following three-phase automaton.
² Phase 1. Player 1 chooses U if q1 = (w1), and D if q1 = (w2). Player 2
chooses L. If the observed signal is y = (U;L) or y = (D;R), then go to
Phase 2. If y = (D;L), then go to Phase 3. If y = (U;R), stay.
² Phase 2. Players choose (U;L) in the rest of the game.
² Phase 3. Players choose (D;R) in the rest of the game.
We claim that the strategy proﬁle with initial state Phase 1 is a PTXE if d
is close to one and e is close to zero. First, players do not want to deviate in
Phase 2 or Phase 3, as (U;L) and (D;R) are static ex-post equilibria. Also, player
1 with q1 = (w1) does not want to deviate in Phase 1. Indeed, if he deviates
9to D, then players are likely to go to Phase 3 and play (D;R) forever, while if
he does not deviate, then players are likely to go to Phase 2 so that (U;L) is
played thereafter. Likewise, we can check that player 1 with q1 = (w2) does not
want to deviate in Phase 1. Player 2’s prescribed play is always a static best
response, and since 2’s play has no effect on the transitions between stages 2 does
not want to deviate either. Note that the payoffs of this equilibrium converge to
((2¡e;2¡e);(2¡e;2¡e)).
Example 2. The next example is a two-player partnership game with two actions
fCi;Dig per player, three possible outcomes H, M, L, and two states.10 The real-
ized payoff functions are independent of w and given by
ui(Ci;y) = ri(y)¡ei and ui(Di;y) = ri(y)
for each i 2 I, w 2 W, and y 2 Y. We assume that the state only inﬂuences the
productivity of player 2’s effort: If player 1 chooses C1 instead of D1 then the
probabilities of H and M increase by pH and pM, independent of the state. In
contrast, if player 2 chooses C2 instead of D2 then the probabilities of H and M
increase by qH and qM in state w1, but they increase only by bqH and bqM in state
w2: If b < 1, the states have different outcome distributions, so can be identiﬁed
by repeated observation. We impose restrictions on the realized payoffs so that
the stage game payoffs in each state correspond to a prisoner’s dilemma: Di is a
dominant strategy, so (D1;D2) is a static ex-post equilibrium, (C1;C2) is efﬁcient,
and V¤ has a non-empty interior.11
Using our results, we will show that a folk theorem holds if player 1 knows
the state and player 2 does not, but that PTXE payoffs are bounded away from
efﬁciency for some parameters if player 2 knows the state and player 1 does not.
The key is that player 2 can learn whether the true state is w1 or w2 by playingC2
no matter what player 1 does, since player 2’s marginal productivity is dependent
on the state but not on player 1’s action. Thus for the case in which player only 1
10If there were only two outcomes as in Radner, Myerson, and Maskin [30], then payoffs are
bounded away from efﬁciency even if the state is known, while with three outcomes the folk
theorem holds for generic signal distributions as FLM shows.
11Speciﬁcally we assume ri(H) > ri(M) > ri(L); e1 > pH(r1(H) ¡ r1(L)) + pM(r1(M) ¡
r1(L)); e2 > qH(r2(H) ¡ r2(L)) + qM(r2(M) ¡ r2(L)); e1 < pH(r1(H) + r2(H) ¡ r1(L) ¡
r2(L))+ pM(r1(M)+r2(M)¡r1(L)¡r2(L)); and e2 < bqH(r1(H)+r2(H)¡r1(L)¡r2(L))+
bqM(r1(M)+r2(M)¡r1(L)¡r2(L)).
10knows the state, even if player 1 tries to hide his private information, player 2 can
learn the true state from the signal distribution. On the other hand, if only player
2 knows the state and he tries to hide it then player 1 cannot learn the true state.
That is, if player 2 chooses D2, then for given any player 1’s action, the signal
distribution is the same for both states, and hence player 1 cannot learn from the
observed signals. See Section 6.3 for details.
4 Sufﬁcient Conditions for Efﬁcient State Learning
In this section we develop “distinguishability” conditions that are sufﬁcient for
limit equilibria in which payoffs are as if players have learned the true state. In
Section 4.2, we relate these conditions to the incentives and information of the
players; roughly speaking, the distinguishability conditions are equivalent to as-
suming that if informed players are willing to reveal the state then uninformed
players cannot prevent them from doing so. When the distinguishability condi-
tions are satisﬁed, the maximal half-spaces in “cross-state” directions (those that
give non-zero weights to payoffs in two or more states) are the whole space, so
the cross-state directions impose no constraints on the limit equilibrium payoffs.
The maximal half-spaces in directions that give non-zero weights to a single state
are the same as in the known-state case considered by FLM, so combining FLM’s
assumptions, our distinguishability assumptions, and Proposition 1 establishes the
existence of limit equilibria with the desired properties.
4.1 Statewise Full Rank and Statewise Distinguishability
We begin with the statewise full rank condition, which is sufﬁcient for the maxi-
mal score to be inﬁnity for all cross-state directions. For each (i;w) 2 I£W and
each type-contingent action proﬁle ~ a 2 £i2I £qi2Qi 4Ai, let P(i;w)(~ a) be a ma-
trix with rows (pw
y (ai;a
q¡i(w)
¡i ))y2Y for all ai 2 Ai. Let P(i;w)(j;w0)(~ a) be a matrix
constructed by stacking two matrices, P(i;w)(~ a) and P(j;w0)(~ a).
Deﬁnition 2. For each (i;w) and (j;w0) satisfying w ,w0, proﬁle~ a has statewise
full rank for (i;w) and (j;w0) if P(i;w)(j;w0)(~ a) has rank jAij+jAjj.
Statewise full rank implies that players can distinguish w and w0 even if player
11i at state w or player j at state w0 deviates. For each pair (i;w) and (j;w0), there
is more likely to be a type-contingent proﬁle ~ a that has statewise full rank as
the partitions Ql for player l become ﬁner. The intuition is that if player l has
more information, then it is easier for the players to learn the true state through
inferences based on player l’s actions. Note that PPXE does not allow players to
condition their play on their types, so it rules out this information channel. We
say more about learning from other players’ actions in Section 4.2.
The next lemma shows that statewise full rank is sufﬁcient for the maximal
scoretobeinﬁnityforallcross-statedirections. Wesaythatatype-contingentpro-
ﬁle~ a is ex-post enforceable if there are v2 RI£jWj, d 2(0;1), and w=(ww)w2W :
Y ! RI£jWj such that (1) holds for all i and w, and (2) holds for all i, w, and ai.
The proof of the lemma is omitted, as it is very similar to Lemma 6 of [17].
Lemma 1. Suppose proﬁle ~ a is ex-post enforceable and has statewise full rank
for (i;w) and (j;w0) satisfying w ,w0. Then, k¤(~ a;l)=¥ for l such that lw
i ,0
and lw0
j , 0.
While the statewise full rank condition is sufﬁcient for efﬁcient learning, it re-
quires at least jAij+jAjj signals. The following condition, statewise distinguisha-
bility, can be satisﬁed with fewer signals and is sufﬁcient for the maximal score
to be inﬁnity for all cross-state directions that have at least one positive compo-
nent. We will soon relax this condition even further, but this deﬁnition is a useful
expositional tool for explaining the more complicated deﬁnitions to come.
Deﬁnition 3. Proﬁle~ a statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0) if there is x =
(x(y))y2Y 2 RjYj such that
(i) pw(aq(w))¢x > pw0
(aq(w0))¢x,
(ii) pw(aq(w))¢x =pw(ai;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )¢x ¸pw(a0
i;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )¢x forallai 2suppa
qi(w)
i
and a0
i 2 Ai,
(iii) pw0
(aq(w0))¢x = pw0
(aj;a
q¡j(w0)
¡j )¢x for all aj 2 Aj.
To interpret this condition, without loss of generality we assume pw0
(aq(w0))¢
x = 0. Clause (i) of this condition assures that the signals generated by ~ a sta-
tistically distinguish w from w0, and moreover picks out a direction x where the
12difference has a particular sign. Clause (ii) says that changing player i’s continu-
ation payoff function in state w from ww
i (y) to ww
i (y)+x(y) preserves incentive
compatibilityforplayeri, andclause(iii)saysthatthechangeinplayeri’scontinu-
ation payoff (of Dww
i (y)´x(y)) can be offset to preserve the feasibility constraint
(lw
i Dww
i (y)+lw0
j Dw ˜ w
j (y)=0) without changing player j’s expected continuation
payoff to any action. Since clause (i) implies pw(aq(w))¢x > 0, this change in
the continuation payoffs increases player i’s expected continuation payoff at state
w, which implies an increases in the score for l such that lw
i > 0. Note that this
deﬁnition is not symmetric between i and j because condition (ii) is an inequality
and condition (iii) is an equality. When this condition is satisﬁed, scaling up the
vector x can generate arbitrarily large scores for all cross-state directions l that
have at least one positive component.
Our next step is to replace statewise distinguishability with an ensemble of
three weaker conditions- this ensemble is weaker because it will allow different
action proﬁles to be used in different directions.
Deﬁnition 4. Proﬁle ~ a m-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0) if there is
x = (x(y))y2Y 2 RjYj such that
(i) pw(aq(w))¢x > pw0
(aq(w0))¢x,
(ii) pw(aq(w))¢x =pw(ai;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )¢x ¸pw(a0
i;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )¢x forallai 2suppa
qi(w)
i
and a0
i 2 Ai,
(iii) pw0
(aq(w0))¢x = pw0
(aj;a
q¡j(w0)
¡j )¢x ¸ pw0
(a0
j;a
q¡j(w0)
¡j )¢x for all aj 2
suppa
qj(w0)
j and a0
j 2 Aj.
Note that this condition relaxes statewise distinguishability by replacing the
last equality in (iii) with an inequality. Lemma 4(a) below shows that a proﬁle that
m-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0) can be used to generate an inﬁnite
score for all l such that lw
i > 0 and lw0
j < 0; the “m” refers to the fact that
positive and negative components are “mixed” in these directions.
Deﬁnition 5. Proﬁle ~ a p-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0) if there is
x = (x(y))y2Y 2 RjYj such that
(i) pw(aq(w))¢x > pw0
(aq(w0))¢x,
13(ii) pw(aq(w))¢x =pw(ai;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )¢x ¸pw(a0
i;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )¢x forallai 2suppa
qi(w)
i
and a0
i 2 Ai,
(iii) pw0
(aq(w0))¢x = pw0
(aj;a
q¡j(w0)
¡j )¢x · pw0
(a0
j;a
q¡j(w0)
¡j )¢x for all aj 2
suppa
qj(w0)
j and a0
j 2 Aj.
Lemma 4(b) below shows that a proﬁle that p-statewise distinguishes (i;w)
from (j;w0) can be used to generate an inﬁnite score for all “positive” directions
l such that lw
i > 0 and lw0
j > 0. As this suggests, this condition is symmetric:
Lemma 2. Suppose ~ a p-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0). Then ~ a p-
statewise distinguishes (j;w0) from (i;w).
Proof. Let x be a vector utilized to p-statewise distinguish (i;w) from (j;w0).
Then the vector ¡x satisﬁes all the conditions of p-statewise distinguishability of
(j;w0) from (i;w). Q.E.D.
Note that if ~ a statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0), then it m-statewise
distinguishes this pair and p-statewise distinguishes this pair.
As we will explain later, the combination of m- and p-statewise distinguisha-
bility is sufﬁcient for a static-threat folk theorem. However, it is not sufﬁcient
for a perfect folk theorem, because the maximal score might not be high enough
in cross-state directions where all the non-zero components are negative. The
following condition is sufﬁcient for the score to be inﬁnitely large for these direc-
tions.
Deﬁnition 6. Proﬁle ~ a n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0) if there is
x = (x(y))y2Y 2 RjYj such that
(i) pw(aq(w))¢x > pw0
(aq(w0))¢x,
(ii) pw(aq(w))¢x =pw(ai;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )¢x ·pw(a0
i;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )¢x forallai 2suppa
qi(w)
i
and a0
i 2 Ai,
(iii) pw0
(aq(w0))¢x = pw0
(aj;a
q¡j(w0)
¡j )¢x ¸ pw0
(a0
j;a
q¡j(w0)
¡j )¢x for all aj 2
suppa
qj(w0)
j and a0
j 2 Aj.
14Lemma 4(c) below shows that a proﬁle that n-statewise distinguishes (i;w)
from (j;w0) can be used to generate an inﬁnite score for all “negative” directions
l suchthatlw
i <0andlw0
j <0. Also, n-statewisedistinguishabilityissymmetric,
as the next lemma shows. We omit the proof, since it is very similar to that of
Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. Suppose ~ a n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0). Then ~ a n-
statewise distinguishes (j;w0) from (i;w).
Now we state the main result of this section, which shows that the score for
cross-state directions can be inﬁnity if the corresponding statewise condition is
satisﬁed. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 4.
(a) Suppose~ a is ex-post enforceable and m-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from
(j;w0). Then k¤(a;l) = ¥ for l such that lw
i > 0 and lw0
j < 0.
(b) Suppose~ a is ex-post enforceable and p-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from
(j;w0). Then k¤(a;l) = ¥ for l such that lw
i > 0 and lw0
j > 0.
(c) Suppose~ a is ex-post enforceable and n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from
(j;w0). Then k¤(a;l) = ¥ for l such that lw
i < 0 and lw0
j < 0.
4.2 Sufﬁcient Conditions for Statewise Distinguishability
In games with incomplete information, players have three possible sources of in-
formation about the state: (i) inference based on the public signals at a state-
independent action proﬁle; (ii) the information contained in their own types; and
(iii) inferences based on the correlation between the opponents’ actions and the
opponents’ types. The ﬁrst information source is studied by [17]. The second
information source is sufﬁcient for perfect learning if every player can distinguish
w and w0. (Note that this corresponds to assumption (ii) of condition (SFR) in
Section 5.) Here we investigate the third information source: inferences based on
the correlation between the opponents’ actions and the opponents’ types. For this
information to generate large scores in cross-state directions, the informed player
must be willing to reveal his information, and uninformed players must not “jam”
15the information revelation of their informed opponents. We address these issues
by providing simple sufﬁcient conditions under which a type-contingent action
proﬁle satisﬁes the various distinguishability conditions.
Deﬁnition 7. Player i can reveal whether w or w0 if there are a 2 A and a0
i 2 Ai
such that pw(a) , pw0
(a0
i;a¡i).
This says that player i can generate different signal distributions at w and w0,
using a type-contingent action. Note that this is necessary for players ¡i to learn
the state from the correlation between player i’s actions and his types. As the
next lemma shows, this condition is sufﬁcient for p-statewise distinguishability
for (i;w) and (i;w0).
Lemma 5. Suppose qi(w),qi(w0) and player i can reveal whether w or w0. Then
there is~ a that p-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (i;w0).
Proof. Let a 2 A and a0
i 2 Ai be such that pw(a) , pw0
(a0
i;a¡i). Then there is
x 2 RjYj such that pw(a)¢x > pw0
(a0
i;a¡i)¢x. Let a¤
i 2 argmaxa00
i pw(a00
i ;a¡i)¢x
and a¤¤
i 2 argmina00
i pw0
(a00
i ;a¡i)¢x. Let ~ a be a type-contingent action proﬁle
such that players play (a¤
i ;a¡i) at state w and (a¤¤
i ;a¡i) at state w0. Then this
~ a p-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (i;w0). Indeed, clause (i) follows from
pw(a¤
i ;a¡i)¢x ¸ pw(a)¢x > pw0
(a0
i;a¡i)¢x ¸ pw0
(a¤¤
i ;a¡i)¢x. Also, clauses (ii)
and (iii) hold, by deﬁnition of a¤
i and a¤¤
i . Q.E.D.
To get the intuition, recall that p-statewise distinguishability is relevant to di-
rections l that put positive weights on payoff for (i;w) and (i;w0). In these di-
rections, player i’s payoffs at w and w0 are both maximized, so she is willing to
reveal her information at both states.
In contrast, even if player i can reveal whether w or w0 there might be no
proﬁle that m-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (i;w0). The reason is that if l
puts negative weight on payoffs at (i;w0), player i’s payoffs at w0 is minimized in
the corresponding LP problem so that he might not want to reveal the true state.
However, the following condition is sufﬁcient for m-statewise distinguishability;
the idea is that player i at state w0 cannot conceal his private information if he
cannot generate the same signal distribution as in state w.
Deﬁnition 8. Player i at w0 cannot hide state w if there is a 2 A such that pw(a)
is not in the convex hull of fpw0
(a0
i;a¡i)ga0
i2Ai.
16Lemma 6. Suppose qi(w) , qi(w0) and player i at w0 cannot hide state w. Then
there is~ a that m-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (i;w0).
Proof. Leta2Abesuchthatpw(a)isnotintheconvexhulloffpw0
(a0
i;a¡i)ga0
i2Ai.
Then from the separating hyperplane theorem, there is x such that pw(a)¢x >
pw0
(a0
i;a¡i)¢x foralla0
i 2Ai. Leta¤
i 2argmaxa0
ipw(a0
i;a¡i)¢x anda¤¤
i 2argmaxa0
ipw0
(a0
i;a¡i)¢
x. Let~ a be a type-contingent action proﬁle such that players play (a¤
i ;a¡i) at state
w and (a¤¤
i ;a¡i) at state w. We claim that this ~ a m-statewise distinguishes (i;w)
from (i;w0). Clause (i) follows from pw(a¤
i ;a¡i)¢x ¸ pw(a)¢x > pw0
(a¤¤
i ;a¡i)¢
x. Also, clauses (ii) and (iii) hold, by deﬁnition of a¤
i and a¤¤
i . Q.E.D.
A similar idea applies to n-statewise condition; here a relevant direction l puts
negative weights on payoffs at (i;w) and (i;w0), so we need to take into account
player i’s incentive for information revelation at both states.
Deﬁnition 9. Player i cannot shufﬂe states w and w0 if there is a 2 A such that
the convex hull of fpw(a0
i;a¡i)ga0
i2Ai and the convex hull of fpw0
(a0
i;a¡i)ga0
i2Ai do
not intersect.
Lemma 7. Suppose qi(w) , qi(w0) and player i cannot shufﬂe states w and w0.
Then there is~ a that n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (i;w0).
Proof. Let a2A be such that the convex hull of fpw(a0
i;a¡i)ga0
i2Ai and the convex
hull of fpw0
(a0
i;a¡i)ga0
i2Ai do not intersect. Then from the separating hyperplane
theorem, there is x such that pw(a0
i;a¡i)¢x > pw0
(a00
i ;a¡i)¢x for all a0
i 2 Ai and
a00
i 2 Ai. Let a¤
i 2 argmina0
ipw(a0
i;a¡i)¢x and a¤¤
i 2 argmaxa0
ipw0
(a0
i;a¡i)¢x. Let
~ a be a type-contingent action proﬁle such that players play (a¤
i ;a¡i) at state w
and (a¤¤
i ;a¡i) at state w. Then as in the proof of the last lemma, we can show that
this~ a n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (i;w0). Q.E.D.
Next we consider statewise distinguishability for (i;w) and (j;w0) where i , j
and only player i knows the state; i.e., qi(w) , qi(w0) and qj(w) = qj(w0).
Deﬁnition 10. Player j at state w0 is irrelevant for (i;w) if there are a 2 A and
a0
i 2 Ai such that pw(a) is not a linear combination of fpw0
(a0
i;a0
j;a¡ij)ga0
j2Aj.
This says that there is an action proﬁle a such that if player i wants to re-
veal whether the true state is w or w0 by choosing ai at w and a0
i at w0, the
17uninformed player j cannot interfere, in the sense that a change in player j’s
action at state w0 cannot result in the overall distribution when i plays a0
i be-
ing the same as the distribution in w under a. For an example where this con-
dition fails, suppose that there are two players with Ai = fa0
i;a00
i g for each i,
and that pw(a0
1;a0
2) = pw(a00
1;a00
2) = pw0
(a0
1;a00
2) = pw0
(a00
1;a0
2) and pw(a0
1;a00
2) =
pw(a00
1;a0
2) = pw0
(a0
1;a0
2) = pw0
(a00
1;a00
2). Here player j at state w0 is not irrelevant
for (i;w). On the other hand this condition can be satisﬁed even if player j has
an option to “jam” player i’s information revelation: Suppose that there are two
states, w1 and w2; and that player 1 knows the state while other players do not.
Let A1 = fU;Dg and A2 = fJ;NJg. Suppose that player 1’s action is observable
if player 2 chooses NJ, while it is unobservable if player 2 chooses J. Suppose
that player l’s actions are always observable for each l , 1. Let a be an action
proﬁle such that a1 =U and a2 = NJ, and let a0
1 = D. Then pw1(a) is not a linear
combination of fpw2(a0
1;a0
2;a¡12)ga0
22Aj, so that player 2 at state w2 is irrelevant
for (1;w1).
The following lemma shows that this irrelevance condition is sufﬁcient for
statewise distinguishability (and hence sufﬁcient for p- and m-statewise distin-
guishability).
Lemma 8. Suppose qi(w) , qi(w0) and player j , i at w0 is irrelevant for (i;w).
Then there is~ a that statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0).
Proof. Let a 2 A and a0
i 2 Ai be such that pw(a) is not a linear combination of
fpw0
(a0
i;a0
j;a¡ij)ga0
j2Aj. Then there is x such that pw(a)>0 and pw0
(a0
i;a0
j;a¡ij)¢
x = 0 for all a0
j 2 Aj. Let a¤
i 2 argmaxa00
i 2Aipw(a00
i ;a¡i)¢x, and let ~ a be a type-
contingent action proﬁle such that players play (a¤
i ;a¡i) at state w and (a0
i;a¡i) at
state w0. We claim that this ~ a statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0). Clause
(ii) of statewise distinguishability follows from a¤
i 2 argmaxa00
i 2Aipw(a00
i ;a¡i)¢x.
Also, since pw(a¤
i ;a¡i) ¸ pw(a) > 0 and pw0
(a0
i;a0
j;a¡ij)¢x = 0 for all a0
j 2 Aj,
clause (i) and (iii) hold. Q.E.D.
The intuition is as follows. Recall that statewise distinguishability is a combi-
nation of p- and m-statewise distinguishability, so the corresponding direction l
gives positive weight to player i’s payoff at state w. Therefore, player i at state
w is willing to reveal his private information. Also, player j at state w0 cannot
interfere with this information revelation.
18For n-statewise distinguishability, we need a stronger assumption, since the
corresponding l puts negative weight on player i’s payoff at state w; so that he
might want to hide his private information.
Deﬁnition 11. Player j at state w0 is strongly irrelevant for (i;w) if there are
(ai;a¡i)2A such that any convex combination of fpw(a0
i;a¡i)ga0
i2Ai is not a linear
combination of fpw0
(ai;a0
j;a¡ij)ga0
j2Aj.
This condition is a combination of “cannot hide” and “irrelevant” conditions:
here player i at state w cannot conceal his private information and player j at state
w0 is irrelevant to player i’s information revelation.
Lemma 9. Suppose qi(w) , qi(w0) and player j , i at w0 is strongly irrelevant
for (i;w). Then there is~ a that n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0).
Proof. Leta2Aanda0
i 2Ai besuchthatanyconvexcombinationoffpw(a00
i ;a¡i)ga00
i 2Ai
is not a linear combination of fpw0
(a0
i;a0
j;a¡ij)ga0
j2Aj. Then there is x such that
pw(a00
i ;a¡i) > 0 for all a00
i 2 Ai and pw0
(a0
i;a0
j;a¡ij)¢x = 0 for all a0
j 2 Aj. Let
a¤
i 2argmina00
i 2Aipw(a00
i ;a¡i)¢x, and let~ a be a type-contingent action proﬁle such
that players play (a¤
i ;a¡i) at state w and (a0
i;a¡i) at state w0. Then as in Lemma
8, we can show that this~ a n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0). Q.E.D.
When player j knows the state and player i does not (i.e., qj(w) , qj(w0) and
qi(w) = qi(w0)), the statewise conditions are satisﬁed under the same conditions
as the case where player i knows the state. Recall that p- and n-statewise condi-
tionsaresymmetric(Lemmas2and3), sothesufﬁcientconditionsfortheprevious
case apply. For the m-statewise condition, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Suppose qj(w) , qj(w0) and player i , j at w is strongly irrelevant
for (j;w0). Then there is~ a that m-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0).
Proof. Leta2Aanda0
j 2Aj besuchthatanyconvexcombinationoffpw0
(a00
j;a¡j)ga00
j2Aj
is not a linear combination of fpw(a0
i;a0
j;a¡ij)ga0
i2Ai. Then there is x such that
pw0
(a00
j;a¡j) < 0 for all a00
j 2 Aj and pw(a0
i;a0
j;a¡ij)¢x = 0 for all a0
i 2 Ai. Let
a¤
j 2 argmaxa00
j2Aj pw0
(ai;a00
j;a¡ij)¢x, and let ~ a be a type-contingent action pro-
ﬁle such that players play (a0
j;a¡j) at state w and (a¤
j;a¡j) at state w0. Then we
can show that this~ a n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0). Q.E.D.
19Finally we consider pairs (i;w) and (j;w0) where there is a player l , i; j who
knows the state (here possibly i = j). If either player i or j can distinguish w from
w0, then the previous lemmas still apply. Thus the interesting case is when both
player i and j do not know the state.
Deﬁnition 12. Both player i at w and player j at w0 are irrelevant for information
revelation by player l , i; j if there are a 2 A and a0
l 2 Al such that any linear com-
binationoffpw(a0
i;al;a¡il)ga0
i2Ai isnotalinearcombinationoffpw0
(a0
j;a0
l;a¡jl)ga0
j2Aj.
This says that if player l wants to reveal his private information then neither
player i at w nor player j at w0 can interfere. The next lemma shows that this
condition is sufﬁcient for p-, m-, and n-statewise distinguishability.
Lemma 11. Suppose there is i2 I, j 2 I, l ,i; j such that ql(w),ql(w0) and that
both player i at w and player j at w0 are irrelevant for information revelation by
player l. Then there is an~ a that p-, m-, and n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from
(j;w0).
Proof. Leta2Aanda0
l 2Al besuchthatanylinearcombinationoffpw(a0
i;al;a¡il)ga0
i2Ai
is not a linear combination of fpw0
(a0
j;a0
l;a¡jl)ga0
j2Aj. Then there are x and k >0
such that pw(a0
i;ai;a¡il) = k for all a0
i 2 Ai and pw0
(a0
j;a0
l;a¡jl)¢x = 0 for all
a0
j 2 Aj. Let~ a be a type-contingent action proﬁle such that players play a at state
w and (a0
l;a¡l) at state w0. Then it is easy to check that this ~ a satisﬁes all the
conditions of p-, m-, and n-statewise distinguishability. Q.E.D.
5 Ex-Post Folk Theorems
In this section we provide two sorts of folk theorem in PTXE: The ﬁrst shows
that all feasible individually rational payoffs can be approximated by payoffs of
PTXE, and the second uses weaker conditions to obtain a “static-threats” version.
In both cases, the key is ﬁnding the appropriate conditions on the combination of
initial private information and the information revealed by the public outcomes.
Recall that P(i;w)(~ a) is a matrix with rows (pw
y (ai;a
q¡i(w)
¡i ))y2Y for all ai 2Ai,
andthatP(i;w)(j;w0)(~ a)isamatrixconstructedbystackingtwomatrices, P(i;w)(~ a)
and P(j;w0)(~ a).
20Deﬁnition 13. Proﬁle ~ a has individual full rank for (i;w) if P(i;w)(~ a) has rank
jAij. Proﬁle ~ a has individual full rank if it has individual full rank for all players
and all states.
This condition implies that at each state, every possible deviation of any one
player leads to a statistically different distribution on outcomes.
Deﬁnition 14. For each (i;w) and (j;w) satisfying i , j, proﬁle ~ a has pairwise
full rank for (i;w) and (j;w) if P(i;w)(j;w)(~ a) has rank jAij+jAjj¡1.
Note that pairwise full rank implies individual full rank; it implies that devia-
tions by one player can be distinguished from deviations by another.
Condition IFR. Every pure action proﬁle~ a has individual full rank.
Condition PFR. For each (i;w) and (j;w) satisfying i , j, there is a proﬁle ~ a
that has pairwise full rank for (i;w) and (j;w).
Condition SFR. For each pair of states (w;w0) satisfying w , w0, at least one of
the following two conditions holds: (i) For each i and j (possibly i = j), there is a
proﬁle ~ a that has statewise full rank for (i;w) and (j;w0), or (ii) ql(w) , ql(w0)
for all l 2 I.
(SFR) requires that for each pair of states w and w0 , w, either (i) for every
(i; j) there is a proﬁle that lets players distinguish state w from state w0, regardless
of whether player i deviates in state w or player j deviates in state w0, or (ii)
players can distinguish these w and w0 using their private information q.
Note that (SFR) fails for (i;w) and (i;w0) if pw is independent of w (so that
the monitoring structure is known) and qj(w) = qj(w0) for all j (so no player’s
private information distinguishes between w and w0). We say more about the case
of a known monitoring structure in Section 7.
The next proposition establishes a general folk theorem in PTXE. Let V¤ ´
fv 2Vj8i 2 I8w 2 W vw
i ¸ vw
i g where vw
i = mina¡imaxaigw
i (ai;a¡i). A subset
W of RI£jWj is smooth if it is closed and convex; it has a non-empty interior; and
there is a unique unit normal for each point on bdW.12
12A sufﬁcient condition for each point on bdW to have a unique unit normal is that bdW is a
C2-submanifold of RI£jWj.
21Proposition 2. Suppose (IFR), (PFR), and (SFR) hold. Then for any smooth strict
subset W of V¤, there is d 2 (0;1) such that W µ E(d) for all d 2 (d;1).
To prove this proposition, we compute the maximal scores for each direction.
The key point is that (SFR) implies the maximal score for cross-state directions
can be made large enough to establish the folk theorem. When the ﬁrst condition
in (SFR) holds, that conclusion comes from Lemma 1. When the second condition
holds, the following lemma applies:
Lemma 12. Suppose (PFR) and (IFR) hold. Let l be such that qi(w) , qi(w0)
for all i 2 I, w 2 W and w0 , w satisfying (lw
j )j2I , 0 and (lw0
j )j2I , 0. Then
k¤(l) ¸ maxv2V¤l ¢v.
This lemma shows that the maximal score in cross-state directions doesn’t
exclude any feasible payoffs if all players know the state. The intuition behind
the lemma is simple. If each player i can distinguish w and w0 using private
information qi, players can choose different action proﬁles contingent on whether
the true state is w or w0. Therefore we expect that the score on state w will not
constrain the score on state w0 so that the maximal score for directions vectors
that only weight these two states will be high enough to achieve the folk theorem.
The formal proof is delegated to the appendix.
Combining this lemma and Lemma 1 shows that the maximum score in all
cross-state directions is at least maxv2V¤l ¢v. This implies that the set Q is de-
termined by l that has non-zero components only for a single state. The follow-
ing lemmas show that (IFR) and (PFR) imply that the maximal score for such
directions is maxv2V¤l ¢v. The proofs are omitted, as they are straightforward
generalizations of FLM.
Lemma 13. Suppose (PFR) holds. Then k¤(l) = maxv2V¤l ¢v for all l such that
(i) (lw
i )i2I , 0 for some w and (lw0
i )i2I = 0 for all w0 , w, and (ii) (lw
i )i2I has
at least two non-zero components or at least one positive component.
Lemma 14. Suppose (IFR) holds. Then k¤(l) = maxv2V¤l ¢v for all l such that
lw
i < 0 for some (i;w) and lw0
j = 0 for all (j;w0) , (i;w).
From these lemmas, we obtain Q =V¤ and hence Proposition 2 follows. Thus
the folk theorem obtains if (IFR), (PFR), and (SFR) hold and if V¤ is full dimen-
sional.
22As we have seen in Section 4.1, statewise full rank is stronger than needed for
efﬁcient learning, and can be replaced with statewise distinguishability.
Condition Pointwise-SD. For each w and w0 satisfying w , w0, at least one of
the following conditions holds: (i) For each i and j (possibly i = j), there is an
ex-post enforceable action proﬁle ~ a that m-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from
(j;w0), there is an ex-post enforceable action proﬁle ~ a0 that p-statewise distin-
guishes (i;w) from (j;w0), and there is an ex-post enforceable action proﬁle ~ a00
that n-statewisedistinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0), or (ii) ql(w),q(w0) for all l 2 I.
This says that for each pair of states w and w0 , w, either (i) for every (i; j)
there is a proﬁle that lets players distinguish state w from state w0, regardless of
whether player i deviates in state w or player j deviates in state w0, or (ii) players
can distinguish these w and w0 using their private information q.
Note that (Pointwise-SD) is weaker than (SFR), since if ~ a has statewise full
rank, then it satisﬁes the m-, p-, and n-statewise distinguishability conditions, but
the converse is false, as the pointwise condition allows different proﬁles to be used
for different directions. On the other hand, (Pointwise-SD) is a “strong” form of
statewise distinguishability as it requires the n-statewise condition.
Proposition 3. Suppose (IFR), (PFR), and (Pointwise-SD) hold. Then for any
smooth strict subset W of V¤, there is d 2 (0;1) such that W µ E(d) for all d 2
(d;1).
The proof of this proposition parallels to that of Proposition 2, with the dif-
ference that Lemma 4 is used instead of Lemma 1 for the conclusion that the
maximum scores in cross-state directions is inﬁnite.
An even weaker condition is sufﬁcient for a static-threat folk theorem: For that
result it is sufﬁcient that the m- and p-statewise conditions can each be satisﬁed
for some proﬁle.
Condition Pointwise-WeakSD. For each w and w0 satisfying w , w0, at least
one of the following conditions holds: (i) For each i and j (possibly i = j), there
is an ex-post enforceable action proﬁle ~ a that m-statewise distinguishes (i;w)
from (j;w0) and there is an ex-post enforceable action proﬁle ~ a0 that p-statewise
distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0), or (ii) ql(w) , q(w0) for all l 2 I.
23Lemmas 5, 6, 8, and 11 imply that (Pointwise-WeakSD) holds if the condition
(i), (ii), or (iii) we stated in the introduction is satisﬁed.
Proposition 4. Suppose (PFR) and (Pointwise-WeakSD) hold. Assume that there
is an ex-post equilibrium ~ a0, i.e., ~ a such that a
qi(w)
i 2 argmaxaigw
i (ai;a
q¡i(w)
¡i )
for all i 2 I and w 2 W. Let V0 ´ fv 2Vj8i 2 I, 8w 2 W vw
i ¸ gw
i (a0)g. Then,
for any smooth strict subset W of V0, there is d 2 (0;1) such that W µ E(d) for
all d 2 (d;1).
The proof of this proposition is similar to that of Proposition 3, with the fol-
lowing differences. In this proposition, we do not assume (IFR) or (Pointwise-
SD), so that Lemma 4(c) and Lemma 14 may not apply. Therefore, it might be
that k¤(l)<maxv2V¤l ¢v for each l ,0 such that lw
i ·0 for all (i;w). For these
directions, we apply the next lemma to show that k¤(l)¸maxv2V0l ¢v. The proof
is straightforward and hence omitted.
Lemma 15. Suppose there is a static ex-post equilibrium~ a0. Then, for any direc-
tion l, k¤(~ a0;l) ¸ l ¢g(~ a0).
Also, since Proposition 4 does not assume (IFR), Lemma 12 does not apply,
so it might be that k¤(l) < maxv2V¤l ¢v for some cross-state directions l. For
these directions, we use the following lemma to show that k¤(l) ¸ maxv2V0l ¢v.
The proof of the lemma can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 16. Suppose (PFR) holds. Let l be such that qi(w) , qi(w0) for all
i 2 I, w 2 W and w0 , w satisfying (lw
j )j2I , 0 and (lw0
j )j2I , 0. Then, k¤(l) ¸
maxv2V0l ¢v.
6 Applications and Examples
This section explores the effect of some plausible assumptions about the moni-
toring structure. The ﬁrst two cases are fairly general; the third illustrates how to
apply the general results by determining the limit payoffs in the partnership game
described in Section 3.
246.1 Separable State Space
In general, the set of limit payoffs depends on the state’s impact on both the moni-
toring structure and the payoff functions. When these dependencies are separable,
the characterization of the limit set can be simpliﬁed. To see this, suppose that the
state consists of two components, one that inﬂuences realized payoffs but not the
monitoring structure and one that inﬂuences the monitoring structure but has no
effect on the realized payoffs. That is, W = F£Y, where uw
i (ai;y) = uw0
i (ai;y) if
f =f0, and pw
y (a)=pw0
y (a) if y =y0. For example, this separability condition is
consistent with a quantity-setting oligopoly game where players do not know the
probability distribution of the market price, and each player knows their own cost
function but not the cost function of the opponents: Here the price is the public
signal y, and the state (cost parameters) has no effect on the distribution of prices
at ﬁxed output levels. Similar examples arise in partnership games where players
know their own effort cost but not that of the opponents.
Condition y-SFR. For each (i;w) and (j;w0) satisfying y , y0, there is an ex-
post enforceable proﬁle~ a that has statewise full rank for (i;w) and (j;w0).
For each y 2Y, let Q(y) denote the set Q for the known monitoring structure
game corresponding to y, i.e., the game where the state space is restricted to
W = F£fyg and the payoff functions uw
i and the monitoring structure pw for
a given w 2 W are the same as those of the original game. The next proposition
shows that the equilibrium payoff set Q of the entire game is a product of Q(y)
over all y. Proposition 7 in Section 7 gives a formula to calculate each set Q(y)
when the monitoring structure pw has “strong full rank.”
Proposition 5. Suppose the state space W is separable and (y-SFR) holds. Then
Q = £y2YQ(y).
Proof. As Lemma 1 shows, if a proﬁle~ a is ex-post enforceable and has statewise
full rank for (i;w) and (j;w0) satisfying w , w0, then k¤(~ a;l) = ¥ for direction
l such that li(w) , 0 and lj(w0) , 0. Thus from (y-SFR), k¤(l) = ¥ for all l
such that li(w) , 0 and lj(w0) , 0 for (w;w0) satisfying y , y0. This proves
Q = £y2YQ(y). Q.E.D.
256.2 Games with a Product Structure
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss games with a product structure, in which there is
a separate signal yi associated with the action of each player i, each player i knows
the distribution of “her” signal, and no player j , i has any private information
about the distribution of yi. This case is of interest as a number of economic
situations have this extra structure; it applies for example to bilateral production
and exchange, where the public signal is the quality of a player’s output, and each
player has private information about the probability that she will make a high-
quality good when she exerts high effort. This structure on its own is not sufﬁcient
for the various folk theorems in Section 5, because m-statewise distinguishability
can fail, but there is full statewise distinguishability in all of the other cross-state
directions.
Formally, weassumethat(i)Y =£i2IYi; (ii)W=£i2IWi; (iii)åy¡i2Y¡ipw
y (a)=
åy¡i2Y¡ipw0
y (a) for each i2 I, a2A, yi 2Yi, w 2W, and w0 2W such that wi =w0
i;
and (iv) pw
y (a) = Õi2Iåy¡i2Y¡ipw
y (a) for each a 2 A, y 2 Y, and w 2 W. Note
that the distribution of yi depends only on ai and wi here. We also assume that
Qi = fq
wi
i jwi 2 Wig where q
wi
i = fw0jw0
i = wig; that is, player i knows the distri-
bution of yi but not the distribution of y¡i. We also assume that every state has
some impact on the distribution of signals in the following sense: for each w 2 W
and w0 , w, there is a 2 A such that pw(a) , pw0
(a). Note that this rules out the
case where the signal distribution is known and the states refer only to the player’s
payoffs.
Intuitively, inthissetupeachplayeriisabletosignalhisprivateinformationwi
wheneverhewants, asnootherplayer’sactioncanbeconfusedwithhisown. Thus
we might expect that the main obstacle to information revelation comes when
player i’s information will be used to lower his payoff. We verify these intuitions
in the on-line supplementary material. Speciﬁcally we provide an example where
m-statewise distinguishability fails, and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 17.
(a) Let (i;w) and (j;w0) be such that i , j and wi , w0
i. Then there is a proﬁle
~ a that statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0).
(b) Let (i;w) and (j;w0) be such that w¡ij , w0
¡ij (and possibly i = j). Then
26there is a proﬁle ~ a that p-, m-, and n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from
(j;w0).
(c) Let (i;w) and (j;w0) be such that wj , w0
j (and possibly i = j). Then there
is a proﬁle~ a that p-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0).
6.3 A Two-Player, Two-Actions Partnership
Now we apply our results to Example 2 from Section 3 to illustrate the effect
of players knowing their own productivity. There are two players, two actions
Ai = fCi;Dig, two states, and three outcomes Y = fH;M;Lg, and the state only
inﬂuences the productivity of player 2’s effort. We will show that the PTXE folk
theorem holds when player 1’s private information distinguishes w1 from w2. On
the other hand, when player 2’s private information distinguishes w1 from w2 but
player 1’s does not, PTXE cannot approximate the efﬁcient outcome for a range of
parameters. Intuitively, player 2 cannot be induced to reveal the state when doing
so would lower his equilibrium payoff, and this leads to a bound on the extent to
which equilibria can trade off player 2’s payoffs between the two states; in some
cases this bound is so strong that it rules out the efﬁcient outcome.
If player 1 choosesC1 instead of D1, the probabilities of H and M increase by
pH and pM, independent of the state. In contrast, if player 2 chooses C2 instead
of D2, the probabilities of H and M increase by qH and qM in state w1, but they
increase only by bqH and bqM in state w2.13 We assume that the vectors (pH;pM)
and (qH;qM) are linearly independent; this implies that individual full rank and
pairwise full rank are satisﬁed at every proﬁle and every state. However, as [17]
show, no type-independent proﬁle p-statewise distinguishes (1;w1) and (2;w2),
andasaresult, thesetofPPXEpayoffsisboundedawayfromefﬁciencyuniformly
in the discount factor.
6.3.1 The Case where Player 1 Knows the State
Supposethatplayer1knowsthestateandplayer2doesnot, thatis, Q1 =f(w1);(w2)g
and Q2 = f(w1;w2)g. The following table shows whether statewise distinguisha-
bility conditions are satisﬁed or not in this case; see the on-line supplementary
13Thus while the state space has a product structure the signals do not.
27material for the formal proof.
(i;w), (j;w0) p-statewise m-statewise
(1;w1), (1;w2) (C1;C2) (C1;C2)
(1;w2), (1;w1) (C1;C2) (C1;C2)
(2;w1), (2;w2) ((C1;D1);C2) (C1;C2)
(2;w2), (2;w1) ((C1;D1);C2) ((C1;D1);C2)
(1;w1), (2;w2) ((C1;D1);C2) (C1;C2)
(2;w2), (1;w1) ((C1;D1);C2) Not satisﬁed
(2;w1), (1;w2) (C1;C2) (C1;C2)
(1;w2), (2;w1) (C1;C2) ((C1;D1);C2)
Since m-statewise distinguishability does not hold for ((2;w2);(1;w1)), the max-
imal scores for the corresponding directions are not inﬁnitely large. Nevertheless,
as shown in the on-line supplementary material, these scores are high enough to
achieve the ex-post folk theorem for any b 2 (0;1). Very roughly speaking, this
is because the state-independent proﬁle (D1;C2) yields sufﬁciently high payoffs
in the corresponding directions (i.e., l ¢g(D1;C2) > maxv2V¤l ¢v for directions l
such that l
w2
2 > 0, l
w1
1 < 0, l
w2
2 = 0, and l
w2
1 · 0) and hence players need not to
learn the state to obtain high scores for these directions. This example shows that
the statewise conditions are sufﬁcient but not necessary for the folk theorem.
6.3.2 The Case where Player 2 Knows the State
Suppose next that player 2 knows the state and player 1 does not. The following
table shows whether statewise conditions are satisﬁed or not. Again, see the on-
line supplementary material for the formal proof.
(i;w), (j;w0) p-statewise m-statewise
(1;w1), (1;w2) (C1;C2) (C1;C2)
(1;w2), (1;w1) (C1;C2) (C1;C2)
(2;w1), (2;w2) (C1;(C1;D2)) (C1;C2)
(2;w2), (2;w1) (C1;(C1;D2)) Not satisﬁed
(1;w1), (2;w2) (C1;(C1;D2)) (C1;C2)
(2;w2), (1;w1) (C1;(C1;D2)) (C1;(C1;D2))
(2;w1), (1;w2) (C1;C2) (C1;C2)
(1;w2), (2;w1) (C1;C2) Not satisﬁed
28In this case the on-line supplementary material shows that the folk theorem fails
because the maximum score in direction l = ((0;¡1);(0;1)) is too low. The
reason is that state-contingent play is needed to generate high payoffs toward this
direction and the failure of m-statewise distinguishability implies that learning the
true state is somewhat costly. Moreover, if the cost of effort is high, then for
l = ((0;¡e);(1;0)) the maximal score can be so low that it rules out equilibrium
with the payoffs of the efﬁcient action proﬁle (C1;C2). Speciﬁcally, this is the
case if player 1’s effort cost is high enough so that g
w2
1 (D1;C2)¡g
w2
1 (C1;C2) is
close to zero.14 Intuitively, player 2 cannot be induced to reveal the state when
doing so would lower his equilibrium payoff, and as a result the maximal score
for direction l with l
w1
2 < 0 is lower than l ¢g(C1;C2).
7 Known Monitoring Structure
So far we have studied a general model, where both payoffs and monitoring struc-
ture can depend on the state of the world, and provided sufﬁcient conditions for
the folk theorems. However, these sufﬁcient conditions may not be satisﬁed in
some games. One notable example is the case of a known monitoring structure;
here a state-independent proﬁle a cannot induce different signal distributions for
different states, so for players to distinguish the states they must have “enough”
private information. In this section we provide conditions for the limit equilib-
rium payoffs of games with a known monitoring structure to coincide with the
limit equilibrium payoffs of the game with observed actions. This shows that the
results of [21] and [22] are robust to imperfect monitoring, as PTXE reduces to
the belief-free equilibria of those papers for perfect-monitoring games. Also we
provide sufﬁcient condition for folk theorems with a known monitoring structure.
Formally, the monitoring structure is known if pw
y (a) = pw0
y (a) for all y 2Y,
a 2 A, w 2 W, and w0 , w. We maintain this assumption throughout this section.
Since pw does not depend on w, we denote it by p.
In this section, we often impose the following strong full rank condition. As
we will see, under this condition the case of a known but imperfect monitoring
14The derivation of this bound on the maximal score is very similar to the proof of Claims
12 and 13 which are used to prove Proposition 12; all of these proofs are in the supplementary
materials.
29structure is very similar to that where actions are perfectly observed. Let Pi(a)
denote the matrix with rows (py(a0
i;a¡i))y2Y for all a0
i 2 Ai. Also, for each i 2 I,
j 2 I, a 2 A, and a0 2 A, let P(i;a)(j;a0) denote the matrix constructed by stacking
two matrices Pi(a) and Pj(a0).
Deﬁnition 15. The monitoring structure p has strong full rank if
(i) P(i;a)(j;a) has rank jAij+jAjj¡1 for all i; j 2 I and a 2 A; and
(ii) for any i; j;2 I, if there is l , i; j, then P(i;a)(j;(a0
l;a¡l)) has rank jAij+jAjj
for all l , i; j, a 2 A, and a0
l , al.
Note that we allow i = j in this deﬁnition, and hence the second clause is not
vacuous even in two-player games. The ﬁrst clause imposes FLM’s pairwise full
rank condition on every action proﬁle. The second clause implies that the state-
wise full rank condition holds for (i;w) and (j;w0) if player l can distinguish the
states w and w0.15 The strong full rank condition is obviously satisﬁed for games
with perfectly observable actions. It is also satisﬁed if the signals are isomor-
phic to the actions and players observe the intended action with a small noise, i.e.
Y = A and py(a) < e for all a 2 A and y , a where e is close to zero.
7.1 Known Monitoring Structure and Strong Full Rank
In this subsection, we show that games with a known monitoring structure and
strong full rank have the same set of limit equilibrium payoffs as games with
observed actions. Speciﬁcally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the monitoring structure is known and has strong full
rank. Suppose also that Q is full dimensional. Then the limit PTXE payoff set for
this game, limd!1E(d) = Q, is equal to the limit set of PTXE payoffs (or belief-
free equilibrium payoffs) for the game that has the same information structure
(W;(Qi)i2I) and the same expected payoffs (gi)i2I but with perfectly observable
actions.
15To see this, let~ a be such that aq(w) = a and aq(w0) = (a0
l;a¡l). Then this~ a has statewise full
rank for (i;w) and (j;w0), as the corresponding matrix has rank jAij+jAjj.
30This shows that with a known monitoring structure and strong full rank, the
analysis of the observed-action case carries over in the obvious way. When strong
fullrankfails, theknown-monitoring-structuregamecanhaveastrictlysmallerset
of limit equilibrium payoffs than when actions are perfectly observable, for much
the same reason that this can occur when the structure of the game is known.
To prove this proposition, we compute the maximal score for each direction l
and show that the score does not depend on the monitoring imperfection. For this,
it is helpful to classify the directions so that the maximal score can be computed
in the same way for all directions in a given class. As shown by FLM, when the
state is known, there are three sorts of directions to consider: (i) maximizing the
payoff of some player i (li > 0 and lj = 0 for all j , i), (ii) minimizing the payoff
of some player i (li < 0 and lj = 0 for all j , i), or (iii) trading off the payoffs
of two or more players (li , 0 for at least two players i.) In our analysis here we
combine all three sorts of directions together into the class L1 of “single-state”
directions; the maximal scores for such l can be computed as in FLM. L2 through
L4 arethesetsofcross-statedirectionsthatsatisfytherelevantversionofstatewise
distinguishability, so the maximal scores in these directions are inﬁnitely large. L5
and L6 are directions that (i) weight only the the payoffs of a single player i but do
so in more than one state and (ii) do not satisfy the relevant version of statewise
distinguishability. L7 is all of the directions that do not ﬁt into classes 1 through
6. The maximal scores for L5, L6, and L7 are not necessarily high enough for the
folk theorem.
Let L1 be the set of l 2 RI£jWj such that (lw
i )i2I , 0 for some w 2 W and
(lw0
i ))i2I = 0 for all w0 , w. Since these directions consider only a single state,
Lemmas 5.2 and 5.4 of FLM show that the maximum score is the maximum fea-
sible score. As a result we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 18. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank.
Then for each l 2 L1, k¤(l) = maxv2V¤l ¢v.
Let L2 be the set of l such that there are i2 I, j 2 I, l ,i; j, w 2W, and w0 2W
such that lw
i , 0, lw0
j , 0, and ql(w) , ql(w0). Here player l can distinguish
between w and w0, and the strong full rank condition implies that if player l tries
to reveal this information by a state-contingent action, both player i at state w and
player j at state w0 are irrelevant to the information revelation. Thus player l’s
31private information can be fully revealed, and as a result the maximal scores for
these directions are inﬁnity.
Lemma 19. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank.
Then for each l 2 L2, k¤(l) = ¥.
Proof. Let l 2 L2, and let i 2 I, j 2 I, l , i; j, w 2 W, and w0 2 W be such that
lw
i , 0, lw0
j , 0, and ql(w) , ql(w0). Since monitoring structure has strong full
rank, both player i at w and player j at w0 are irrelevant for player l’s information
revelation. Then from Lemmas 11 there is ¡ ! a that p, m, and n-statewise distin-
guishes (i;w) from (j;w0) and from Lemma 4, we have k¤(l) = ¥. Q.E.D.
Let L3 be the set of l such that there are i 2 I, j , i, w 2 W, and w0 , w such
that lw
i > 0, lw0
j , 0, and qi(w) , qi(w0). Here player i can distinguish between
w and w0, and the score is increasing in player i’s payoff in state w. Since the
strong full rank condition implies that player j at w0 is irrelevant to (i;w), player
i’s private information can be fully revealed and the maximal scores for these
directions are inﬁnity as well.16
Lemma 20. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank.
Then for each l 2 L3, k¤(l) = ¥.
Proof. Let l 2 L3, and let i 2 I, j , i, w 2 W, and w0 2 W be such that lw
i > 0,
lw0
j , 0, and qi(w) , qi(w0). Sine the monitoring structure has strong full rank,
player j at w0 is irrelevant for (i;w). Then from Lemma 8, there is~ a that statewise
distinguishes (i;w) from (j;w0). Since lw
i > 0, Lemma 4 applies. Q.E.D.
Let L4 be the set of l such that there are i 2 I, w0 2 W, and w00 , w0 such
that lw0
i > 0, lw00
i > 0, (lw
j )w2W = 0 for all j , i, and qi(w0) , qi(w00). Here only
player i’s payoffs matter, the score is increasing in i’s payoff in w and w0, and
player i can distinguish between these two states. Once again, the maximal scores
for these directions are inﬁnity, as strong full rank implies that player i can reveal
whether w or w0.
Lemma 21. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank.
Then for each l 2 L4, k¤(l) = ¥.
16The intersection of L2 and L3 might be non-empty but this is irrelevant as the maximal score
is inﬁnity for either case.
32Proof. Let l 2 L4, and let i 2 I, w0 2 W, and w00 2 W be such that lw0
i > 0,
lw00
i >0, and qi(w0),qi(w00). Since the monitoring structure has strong full rank,
player i can reveal whether the state if w or w0. Then from Lemma 5, there is ~ a
that p-statewise distinguishes (i;w0) from (i;w00). Since lw0
i > 0 and lw00
i > 0,
Lemma 4(b) applies. Q.E.D.
Let L5(i) be the set of l such that (lw
i )w2W · 0, (lw
i )w2W , 0, (lw
j )w2W = 0
for all j , i, and qj(w) = qj(w0) for all j , i, w 2 W, and w0 , w satisfying
lw
i ,0 and lw0
i ,0. Here only player i’s payoffs matter, the score is decreasing in
i’s payoff, and no other player can distinguish between the states; these directions
determine the minmax payoff for player i, taking into account a trade-off between
the minmax level in one state and the payoffs in other states. Let L5 =
S
i2IL5(i).
Lemma 22. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank.
Then for each i and l 2 L5(i), k¤(l) = maxa¡iminaiåw2Wlw
i (w)gw
i (ai;a¡i),
that is, k¤(l) = ¡mina¡imaxaiåw2W¡lw
i gw
i (ai;a¡i).
The proof is delegated to the appendix. The intuition is as follows: Strong
full rank implies that constraints (i) and (ii) can be satisﬁed for all j , i, and
because (lw
j )w2W = 0 the continuation payoffs assigned to j , i are irrelevant.
Thus we only need to consider continuation payoffs for player i that satisfy (i)
and (ii) for w such that lw
i , 0, and the feasibility constraint (iii). Note also
that player j , i has to use the same action aj for all states w with lw
i , 0; as
he cannot distinguish these states by deﬁnition of L5(i). Summing the incentive-
compatibility constraints over the states w (taking into account that lw
i ·0) yields
a “weaker aggregate incentive condition,” which corresponds to a game with a
known state where player i’s payoff is åw2W¡lw
i gw
i (a). Using this analogy, we
can show that the maximal score in the direction of minimizing this payoff (that
is, maximizing ¡åw2W¡lw
i vw
i ) is at most the corresponding minmax payoff,
namely ¡mina¡imaxaiåw2W¡lw
i gw
i (ai;a¡i). We then use the strong full rank
assumption to show that this bound is attained.
Let L6 be the set of l such that there is i2 I such that lw
i >0 for some w 2W,
(lw
j )w2W = 0 for all j , i, qi(w0) = qi(w00) for all w0 2 W and w00 , w0 satisfying
lw0
i > 0 and lw00
i > 0, and qj(w0) = qj(w00) for all j , i, w0 2 W, and w00 , w
satisfying lw0
i , 0 and lw00
i , 0. In words, this says that only player i’s payoff has
non-zero weights, that player i cannot distinguish between any two states where
33his utility gets positive weight, and no other player can distinguish between any
two states where player i’s utility gets non-zero weight.
Finally, we construct a set L7 that we show contains all directions that do not
belong to one of the preceding sets. We deﬁne L7 to be the set of all l satisfying
the following properties.
(i) (lw
i )w2W , 0 and (lw
j )w2W , 0 for some i 2 I and j , i.
(ii) (lw0
l )l2I , 0 and (lw00
l )l2I , 0 for some w0 2 W and w00 , w0.
(iii) ql(w000) = ql(w0000) for l 2 I, w000 2 W, and w0000 , w000, if lw000
l0 , 0 for some
l0 , l and lw0000
l00 , 0 for some l00 , l.
(iv) ql(w000)=ql(w0000) for l 2 I, w000 2W, and w0000 ,w000 if lw000
l >0 and lw0000
l0 ,
0 for some l0 , l.
In words, this is the set of directions where the score depends on the payoffs of
players i and j in some state w, and where it also depends on the payoff of some
player l (possibly i or j) in two other states w0 and w00, but this player l cannot
distinguish between any states w000 and w0000 if either (condition (iii)) in each of
these states there is at least one other player whose payoff matters or (condition
(iv)) the score is increasing in l’s payoff in state w000 and depends on the payoff of
some l0 in state w0000.
Lemma 23.
S7
n=1Ln = RI£jWjnf(0;¢¢¢ ;0)g
Proof. Let l be such that l , (0;¢¢¢ ;0) and l < L7. It sufﬁces to show that
l 2
S6
n=1Ln. If l does not satisfy the clause (ii) of the deﬁnition of L7, then
l 2 L1. If l does not satisfy (iii), then l 2 L2. If l does not satisfy (iv), then
l 2 L3. If l satisﬁes (iii) and (iv) but not (i), then l 2 L4S
L5S
L6. Q.E.D.
Lemma 24. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank.
Then for each l 2 L6S
L7, k¤(l) = maxa l ¢g(a).
The proof is given in the appendix. The ﬁrst step of the proof is to show that
for each l 2 L6S
L7, there is a single “type” q¤
i that is relevant; we use this to
show that the upper and lower bounds on the score are both maxa l ¢g(a).
Combining the above lemmas yields the following characterization of the
maximal scores in each direction and thus of the set Q.
34Proposition 7. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full
rank. Then
k¤(l) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
maxv2V¤l ¢v if l 2 L1:
¥ if l 2 L2S
L3S
L4
maxa¡iminaiåw2Wlw
i gw
i (ai;a¡i) if l 2 L5(i)
maxa l ¢g(a) if l 2 L6S
L7
;
and Q =
T
i2f1;:::;7g;l2LiH¤(l):
This proposition shows that the monitoring imperfection does not affect the
maximal score. Then the set Q does not depend on the monitoring imperfection
as well, and hence Proposition 6 follows.
7.2 One-Sided Incomplete Information
In this subsection we consider the case where only player 1’s payoff function
is uncertain, and he knows his own payoff function while the other players do
not. Formally, we say the game has one-sided incomplete information if gw
i (a) =
gw0
i (a) for all i,1, a2A, w 2W, and w0 ,w; and that q1(w)=(w) for all w, and
Qi = f(W)g for all i , 1. This is the assumption made in H¨ orner and Lovo (2009,
Section 4) and H¨ orner, Lovo and Tomala (2009, Section 6) analysis of reputations,
so once again our results can be seen as extending theirs.
Section 5 of [22] derives several sufﬁcient conditions for Q (denoted by V¤ in
their paper) to be non-empty,17 which implies that there is a PTXE in the undis-
counted case. However these conditions do not assure the existence of PTXE with
the discounted payoff criterion used in this paper, because Q might not be full
dimensional and in that case their existence result and our Proposition 1 would
not apply. In this subsection, we give a simple sufﬁcient condition for Q to be full
dimensional; under this condition, Q equals the set of limit PTXE payoffs so that
there are PTXE for sufﬁciently large d.
LetVU be the set of feasible payoffs of the stage game with public randomiza-
tion, that is, VU = cofg(a)ja 2 Ag. Note that dimVU is at most jWj+I¡1, since
17They also give tight conditions for Q to be non-empty by imposing restrictions on the payoff
functions as well as on the information structure.
35gw
i (a) = gw0
i (a) for all i , 1, a 2 A, w 2 W, and w0 , w. Let
VU¤ = fv 2VUj8i9a¡i8w; vw
i ¸ max
ai
gw
i (ai;a¡i)g:
Condition Non-E. The set VU¤ has dimension jWj+I¡1.
This condition is likely to be satisﬁed if there is an action a¡1 that gives low
payoffs to player 1 for every state w. The next proposition shows that (Non-E) is
sufﬁcient for the set Q to be full dimensional; then Proposition 1 applies, and so
(Non-E) is a sufﬁcient condition for the existence of PTXE.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the monitoring structure is known and has strong
full rank, and that there is one-sided incomplete information. Suppose also that
(Non-E) holds. Then dimQ = I£jWj.
Proof. Let v be in the relative interior ofVU¤. It sufﬁces to show that k¤(l)>l ¢v
for all l.
First, consider l 2 L1. Since VU¤ µ V¤, v is an interior point of V¤. Then
l ¢v < maxv02V¤l ¢v0 = k¤(l) for l 2 L1. Likewise, since VU¤ µ VU, v is an
interior point of VU. Then, l ¢v < maxv02VU l ¢v0 = maxa l ¢g(a) = k¤(l) for
l 2 L6 and l 2 L7.
Since k¤(l) = ¥ for l 2 L2S
L3S
L4, it remains to consider l 2 L5. By
the deﬁnition of L5, (lw
1 )w2W , 0, lw
1 · 0 for all w 2 W, and (lw
j )w2W = 0 for
all j , 1. Also, since v is in the relative interior of VU¤, there is a¡1 such that
vw
1 > maxa1gw
1 (a1;a¡1) for all w 2 W. Taken together, we obtain
l ¢v = å
w2W
lw
1 vw
1 < å
w2W
lw
1 max
a1
gw
1 (a1;a¡1) = å
w2W
min
a1
lw
1 gw
1 (a1;a¡1)
< max
a0
¡1
min
a1 å
w2W
lw
1 gw
1 (a1;a0
¡1) = k¤(l);
as desired. Here, the equality in the third line comes from
lw
1 max
a1
gw
1 (a1;a¡1) = ¡lw
1 min
a1
(¡gw
1 (a1;a¡1)) = jlw
1 jmin
a1
(¡gw
1 (a1;a¡1))
= min
a1
jlw
1 j(¡gw
1 (a1;a¡1)) = min
a1
lw
1 gw
1 (a1;a¡1)):
Q.E.D.
36Remark 3. If there is a “commitment type” w¤, for which there is some a¤
1 2
A1 such that gw¤
1 (a¤
1;a¡1) is independent of a¡1 and gw¤
1 (a¤
1;a¡1) ¸ gw¤
1 (a) for
all a1 2 A1, the minimax payoff of this commitment type equals his best payoff
gw¤
1 (a¤
i ;a¡i). In this case the set Q does not have full dimension, and our results
do not apply.18 Moreover, in this case the set of PTXE is often empty. Suppose
that there are two players, and player 2 has a unique best reply against a¤
1, and call
it a¤
2. In a PTXE, player 1 in state w¤ always play a¤
1, so that player 2 must play
a¤
2 after every history, independently of the state. Then player 1’s optimal strategy
for state w , w¤ is to choose aw
1 2 argmaxa12A1gw
1 (a1;a¤
2) after every history. For
this strategy proﬁle to be a PTXE, a¤
2 must be a best reply to aw
1 for all w , w¤,
but such a condition is not satisﬁed in general. Thus we conclude that there is no
PTXE for any discount factor.19
7.3 The Folk Theorem with Known Monitoring Structure
Our general folk theorem uses (SFR) or (Pointwise-SD), which require either that
all players can distinguish every pair of states, or that there are proﬁles~ a that sat-
isfy various full rank conditions. With a known monitoring structure (and strong
full rank) the following simpler condition is sufﬁcient.
Proposition 9. Suppose that the monitoring structure is known and has strong full
rank. Suppose also that for each (w;w0) satisfying w ,w0, there are at least three
players who can distinguish w and w0, i.e., there are i 2 I, j , i, and l , i; j such
that qi(w) , qi(w0), qj(w) , qj(w0), and ql(w) , ql(w0). Then, for any smooth
strict subsetW ofV¤, there exists d 2(0;1) such thatW µE(d) for all d 2(d;1).
Proof. Since there are at least three players who can distinguish w and w0, any
cross-state direction l is an element of L2. Then, from Proposition 7, we have
k¤(l) = ¥. Since k¤(l) = maxv2V¤l ¢v for any l 2 L1, we obtain Q = V¤.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 5.3 of [22] shows that Q is non-empty for games with perfect mon-
itoring, if there are there are at least three players who can distinguish w and w0
18[21] make essentially this point on page 475.
19If there are observed actions, these same assumptions imply that there is not a belief-free
equilibrium. [21] note that there is a belief-free equilibrium with a commitment type in strictly
dominant action games with a unique Stackelberg type.
37for each (w;w0) satisfying w , w0; our result shows that the assumptions of that
proposition are in fact sufﬁcient for a folk theorem.
In the next proposition, we consider the case in which there are at least two
players who can distinguish states. Recall that VU is the set of feasible payoffs of
the stage game with public randomization, that is, VU = cofg(a)ja 2 Ag.
Proposition 10. Suppose that the monitoring structure is known and satisﬁes
strong full rank. Suppose also that for each (w;w0) satisfying w , w0, there are at
least two players who can distinguish w and w0, i.e., there are i 2 I and j , i such
that qi(w) , qi(w0) and qj(w) , qj(w0). Let V¤¤ ´ fv 2V¤j9˜ v 2VU8i 2 I8w 2
W; vw
i ¸ ˜ vw
i g. Then, for any smooth strict subset W of V¤¤, there is d 2 (0;1)
such that W µ E(d) for all d 2 (d;1).
Note that if there is a “bad outcome” a 24A such that gw
i (a)·vw
i for all i2 I
and w 2 W, then we have V¤¤ = V¤, so that the folk theorem obtains. Theorem
5.11 of [22] shows that Q is non-empty for games with perfect monitoring and a
bad outcome, if there are there are at least two players who can distinguish w and
w0 foreach (w;w0)satisfying w ,w0. Againour resultshowsthatthe assumptions
of the proposition are sufﬁcient for a folk theorem.
Proof. It sufﬁces to show thatV¤¤ µ Q. To do so, we compute the maximal score
k¤(l) for every direction, using Proposition 7.
First, considerl 2L1. ItfollowsfromProposition7thatk¤(l)=maxv2V¤l ¢v
for this direction. Next, consider l such that lw0
i , 0 and lw00
i , 0 for some i 2 I,
w0 2 W, and w00 , w0, and (lw
j )w2W = 0 for all j , i. Since there are at least two
players who can distinguish w0 and w00, there is l , i such that ql(w0) , ql(w00).
Thus l 2 L2, and hence k¤(l) = ¥ for this direction.
Consider l such that lw0
i , 0 and lw00
j , 0 for some i 2 I, j , i, w0 2 W, and
w00 , w0, and ql(w0) , ql(w00) for some l , i; j. Again, l 2 L2 in this case, so
that k¤(l) = ¥. Consider l such that lw0
i > 0 and lw00
j , 0 for some i 2 I, j , i,
w0 2 W, and w00 , w0, and ql(w0) = ql(w00) for all l , i; j. Since there are at least
two players who can distinguish w0 and w00, it must be that qi(w0) , qi(w00) and
qj(w0) , qj(w00). This implies that l 2 L3, and hence k¤(l) = ¥.
Finally, consider l such that l · 0, lw0
i < 0 and lw00
j < 0 for some i 2 I, j ,i,
w0 2 W, and w00 , w0, and for any pair (i;w000) and (j;w0000) satisfying w000 , w0000,
38lw000
i < 0, and lw0000
j < 0, and for any l , i; j, ql(w000) = ql(w0000). By deﬁnition,
l 2 L7 in this case, so that k¤(l) = maxa l ¢g(a) = maxv2VU l ¢v.
From the above arguments, obviously we have V¤¤ ½ H¤(l) for all l. There-
fore, V¤¤ µ Q. Q.E.D.
8 Conclusion
This paper shows how to extend the insights and techniques of the repeated games
literature to games with imperfectly observed actions, an unknown monitoring
structure, and private information. Our analysis is based on the fact that the set
of PTXE payoffs has a recursive structure, and says little about the entire set of
equilibrium payoffs. When the folk theorem holds in PTXE, or more generally
when there are asymptotically efﬁcient PTXE, the restriction to PTXE may be
of less concern, especially given their desirable robustness properties. When the
set of PTXE is small or empty, it would be nice to know more about the entire
set of sequential equilibrium payoffs; that more difﬁcult problem is still unre-
solved. Another open question is to extend the analysis of PTXE to other settings
where repeated play has been shown to support more efﬁcient outcomes, such as
games with long-run and short-run players (Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin [13]
and [14]), games with overlapping generations of players (Kandori [24]), commu-
nity enforcement (Kandori [23] and Ellison [11]), games with imperfect private
monitoring (Compte [7] and Kandori and Matsushima [26]), and games where the
state evolves according to a ﬁnite Markov chain (Athey and Bagwell [4]).
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4.
(a) Suppose~ a is ex-post enforceable and m-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from
(j;w0). Then k¤(a;l) = ¥ for l such that lw
i > 0 and lw0
j < 0.
(b) Suppose~ a is ex-post enforceable and p-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from
(j;w0). Then k¤(a;l) = ¥ for l such that lw
i > 0 and lw0
j > 0.
39(c) Suppose~ a is ex-post enforceable and n-statewise distinguishes (i;w) from
(j;w0). Then k¤(a;l) = ¥ for l such that lw
i < 0 and lw0
j < 0.
Proof. For part (a), let x = (x(y))y2Y be as in the deﬁnition of m-statewise dis-
tinguishability. Without loss of generality, assume pw0
(a)¢x = 0. Let zw
i =
(zw
i (y))y2Y and zw0
j = (zw0
j (y))y2Y be such that
zw
i (y) =
K
dlw
i pw(a)¢x
x(y) and zw0
j (y) = ¡
K
dlw0
j pw(a)¢x
x(y)
for all y 2Y. Since pw(a)¢x = pw(ai;a¡i)¢x > 0 for ai 2 suppai, we have
pw(ai;a¡i)¢zw
i =
K
dlw
i pw(a)¢x
pw(ai;a¡i)¢x =
K
dlw
i
(3)
for all ai 2 suppai. Also, since pw(a)¢x > 0 and pw(a)¢x ¸ pw(ai;a¡i)¢x for
ai < suppai, we have
pw(ai;a¡i)¢zw
i =
K
dlw
i pw(a)¢x
pw(ai;a¡i)¢x ·
K
dlw
i
(4)
for all ai < suppai. Likewise, since pw(a)¢x > 0, pw0
(aj;a¡j)¢x = 0 for all
aj 2 suppaj, and pw0
(aj;a¡i)¢x · 0 for all aj < suppaj,
pw0
(aj;a¡j)¢zw0
j = ¡
K
dlw0
j pw(a)¢x
pw0
(aj;a¡j)¢x(y) = 0 (5)
for all aj 2 suppaj, and
pw0
(aj;a¡j)¢zw0
j = ¡
K
dlw0
j pw(a)¢x
pw0
(aj;a¡j)¢x · 0 (6)
for all aj < suppaj. Finally, it is obvious that
lw
i zw
i (y)+lw0
j zw0
j (y) = 0 (7)
for all y 2Y.
Let (˜ v; ˜ w) be a pair of a payoff vector and a function such that ˜ w enforces
(˜ v;a). Let K > maxy2Y l ¢ ˜ w(y)¡l ¢ ˜ v. Then, let
ww00
l (y) =
8
> <
> :
˜ ww
i (y)+zw
i (y) if (l;w) = (i;w)
˜ ww0
j (y)+zw0
j (y) if (l;w00) = (j;w0)
˜ ww00
l (y) otherwise
40for each y 2Y. Also, let
vw00
l =
8
> > > <
> > > :
˜ vw
i +
K
lw
i
if (l;w00) = (i;w)
˜ vw00
l otherwise
:
We claim that this (v;w) satisﬁes all the constraints in the LP problem. Obvi-
ously, constraints (i) and (ii) are satisﬁed for all (l;w)2(I£W)nf(i;w);(j;w0)g,
as vw00
l = ˜ vw00
i and w ¯ w
l (y) = ˜ ww00
l (y). Also, since (3) and (4) hold and ˜ w enforces
(a; ˜ v), we obtain
(1¡d)gw
i (ai;a¡i)+dpw(ai;a¡i)¢ww
i
= (1¡d)gw
i (ai;a¡i)+dpw(ai;a¡i)¢( ˜ ww
i +zw
i ) = ˜ vw
i +
K
lw
i
= vw
i
for all ai 2 suppai, and
(1¡d)gw
i (ai;a¡i)+dpw(ai;a¡i)¢ww
i
= (1¡d)gw
i (ai;a¡i)+dpw(ai;a¡i)¢( ˜ ww
i +zw
i ) · ˜ vw
i +
K
lw
i
= vw
i
for all ai < suppai. Hence, (v;w) satisﬁes constraints (i) and (ii) for (i;w). Like-
wise, it follows from (5) and (6) that (v;w) satisﬁes constraints (i) and (ii) for
(j;w0). Furthermore, using (7) and K > maxy2Y l ¢ ˜ w(y)¡l ¢ ˜ v,
l ¢w(y) = l ¢ ˜ w(y)+lw
i zw
i (y)+lw0
j zw0
j (y) = l ¢ ˜ w(y) < l ¢ ˜ v+K = l ¢v
for all y 2Y, and hence constraint (iii) holds. Therefore, k¤(a;l) ¸ l ¢v = l ¢ ˜ v+
K. Since K can be arbitrarily large, we conclude k¤(a;l) = ¥, which proves part
(a) of the lemma.
For parts (b) and (c), let x = (x(y))y2Y be as in the deﬁnition of p- or n-
statewise distinguishability. Without loss of generality, assume pw0
(a)¢x = 0.
The rest of the proof is the same as in part (a). Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 12
Lemma 12. Suppose (PFR) and (IFR) hold. Let l be such that qi(w) , qi(w0)
for all i 2 I, w 2 W and w0 , w satisfying (lw
j )j2I , 0 and (lw0
j )j2I , 0. Then,
k¤(l) ¸ maxv2V¤l ¢v.
41Proof. For each w 2 W, let l(w) = (lw0
i (w))(i;w0) be such that (lw
i (w))i2I =
(lw
i )i2I and (lw0
i (w))i2I = 0 for all w0 , w. Let W¤ be the set of all w such that
l(w) , 0. We claim
k¤(~ a;l) ¸ å
w2W¤
k¤(~ a;l(w)) (8)
for each~ a. In words, k¤(~ a;l) is at least the sum of the maximal scores when we
solve the LP problem for each state w in isolation. To prove this, consider the LP
problem for (~ a;l) but constraint (iii) is replaced with a more restrictive condition
(iii0) å
i2I
lw
i vw
i ¸å
i2I
lw
i ww
i (y) for all w 2 W and y 2Y:
Let kU(~ a;l) denote the solution to this new problem. Since condition (iii0) does
not allow utility transfer across different states, considering this new LP problem
is equivalent to solving a separate LP problem for each state w 2 W¤ in isolation.
Thus we have kU(~ a;l) = åw2W¤k¤(~ a;l(w)). Since k¤(~ a;l) ¸ kU(~ a;l), (8)
follows.
Recall that l(w) considers only a single state w. Thus the maximal score
k¤(~ a;l(w)) depends on aq(w) but not on aq0
for other q0. This observation, to-
gether with the fact that all players can distinguish any state in the set W¤, implies
that
sup
~ a å
w2W¤
k¤(~ a;l(w)) = å
w2W¤
sup
~ a
k¤(~ a;l(w)):
It follows from Lemmas 13 and 14 that sup~ a k¤(~ a;l(w)) = maxv2V¤l(w)¢v.
Therefore,
sup
~ a å
w2W¤
k¤(~ a;l(w)) = å
w2W¤
max
v2V¤l(w)¢v = max
v2V¤l ¢v:
Using (8), we obtain the desired result. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 16
Lemma 16. Suppose (PFR) holds. Let l be such that qi(w) , qi(w0) for all
i 2 I, w 2 W and w0 , w satisfying (lw
j )j2I , 0 and (lw0
j )j2I , 0. Then, k¤(l) ¸
maxv2V0l ¢v.
42Proof. The proof is very similar to Lemma 12. The only difference is that in
the last step of the proof, we may not have sup~ a k¤(~ a;l(w)) = maxv2V¤l(w)¢v,
since(IFR)mightfail. Instead, weuseLemmas13and15toshowthatsup~ a k¤(~ a;l(w))¸
maxv2V0l(w)¢v. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 22
Lemma 22. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank.
Then for each i and l 2 L5(i), k¤(l) = maxa¡iminaiåw2Wlw
i (w)gw
i (ai;a¡i),
that is, k¤(l) = ¡mina¡imaxaiåw2W¡lw
i gw
i (ai;a¡i).
To prove this lemma, we use the following claims.
Claim 1. Let l 2 L5(i). Then for each j , i, there is q¤
j 2 Qj that contains all w
such that lw
i , 0.
Proof. Suppose not, so that there are w 2 W and w0 , w such that such that
qj(w) , qj(w0), lw
i , 0, and lw0
i , 0. Then l < L5(i), since it does not satisfy the
last condition of the deﬁnition of L5(i). A contradiction. Q.E.D.
Claim 2. Suppose the monitoring structure is known. Let l 2 L5(i): Then for
each ~ a = ((a
qi
i )qi2Qi)i2I, k¤(~ a;l) · minail ¢g(ai;a
q¤
¡i
¡i ) where q¤
¡i is chosen as
in Claim 1 and a
q¤
¡i
¡i = (a
q¤
j
j )j,i.
Proof. Let a0
i 2 argminail ¢g(ai;a
q¤
¡i
¡i ). If k¤(~ a;l) = ¡¥ then the result is obvi-
ous. If k¤(~ a;l) > ¡¥, we can choose (v;w) to satisfy constraints (i) through (iii)
in the LP problem associated with (~ a;l;d) for some d 2 (0;1). It follows from
constraint (ii) that
vw
i ¸ (1¡d)gw
i (ai;a
q¤
¡i
¡i )+dp(ai;a
q¤
¡i
¡i )¢ww
i
for all i, ai, and w such that lw
i , 0, since qj(w) = q¤
j for j , i for such w.
Multiplying both sides by lw
i ; summing over all w, and using the fact that lw
j =0
for all j , i; we have
l ¢v = å
w2W
lw
i vw
i · (1¡d) å
w2W
lw
i gw
i (a0
i;a
q¤
¡i
¡i )+d å
w2Wå
y2Y
py(a0
i;a
q¤
¡i
¡i )lw
i ww
i (y)
= (1¡d)l ¢g(a0
i;a
q¤
¡i
¡i )+d å
y2Y
py(a0
i;a
q¤
¡i
¡i )l ¢w(y);
43so from (iii),
l ¢v · (1¡d)l ¢g(a0
i;a
q¤
¡i
¡i )+dl ¢v:
Subtracting dl ¢v from both sides and dividing by (1¡d), we get l ¢v · l ¢
g(a0
i;a
q¤
¡i
¡i ). Therefore, k¤(~ a;l;d) · g(a0
i;a
q¤
¡i
¡i ). Q.E.D.
For each j 2 I, let ˜ gj(a)=¡åw2Wlw
i gw
j (a). Let ˜ l 2 RI be such that ˜ li =¡1
and ˜ lj = 0 for all j , i. Consider the following LP problem:
˜ k¤(a; ˜ l;d) = max
˜ v2RI
˜ w:Y!RI
˜ l ¢ ˜ v subject to
(i) ˜ vj = (1¡d)˜ gj(a)+dp(a)¢ ˜ wj for all j,
(ii) ˜ vj = (1¡d)˜ gj(aj;a¡j)+dp(aj;a¡j)¢ ˜ wj for all j and aj,
(iii) ˜ l ¢ ˜ v ¸ ˜ l ¢ ˜ w(y) for all y.
This is the problem of ﬁnding the maximum score for a known-state game (i.e.,
jWj = 1) for direction ˜ l, so its value (which does not depend on d) follows from
past work:
Claim 3. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank.
Then supa ˜ k¤(a; ˜ l) = ¡mina¡imaxai ˜ gi(ai;a¡i)
Proof. Strong full rank implies that every pure action proﬁle has individual full
rank. Then from FLM Lemma 6.3, the maximal score for direction ˜ l is given
by player i’s minimax score. Therefore, ˜ k¤(a; ˜ l) = ¡mina¡imaxai ˜ gi(ai;a¡i).
Q.E.D.
Claim 4. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank. Let
l 2 L5(i). Then k¤(~ a;l) = ˜ k¤(a; ˜ l) if~ a is a state-independent action a.
Proof. First, we show k¤(~ a;l) · ˜ k¤(a; ˜ l). When k¤(~ a;l) = ¡¥, then this in-
equality obviously follows. So assume k¤(~ a;l) > ¡¥. Choose (v;w) to sat-
isfy constraints (i) through (iii) in the LP problem for (~ a;l;d), and let ˜ vj =
¡åw2Wlw
j vw
j and ˜ wj = ¡åw2Wlw
j ww
j (y) for all j 2 I and y 2 Y. Then this
(˜ v; ˜ w) satisﬁes all the constraints of the LP problem for (a; ˜ l;d), and l ¢v = ˜ l ¢ ˜ v.
This shows that k¤(~ a;l) · ˜ k¤(a; ˜ l).
Next, we show k¤(~ a;l)¸ ˜ k¤(a; ˜ l). As before we restrict attention to the case
of ˜ k¤(a; ˜ l) > ¡¥.
44We claim there are (zw
i (y))(w;y) such that
(1¡d)
µ
¡
˜ gi(ai;a¡i)
åw2Wlw
i
¡gw
i (ai;a¡i)
¶
= dp(ai;a¡i)¢zw
i (9)
for all w 2 W and ai 2 Ai, and
å
w2W
lw
i zw
i (y) = 0 (10)
for all y 2Y. To see that this system has a solution, choose w0 such that lw0
i , 0,
and eliminate zw0
i using (10). Then we can check that (9) for w0 are redundant
equations; that is, (9) for w0 automatically holds if (9) holds for all w , w0. This
leaves (jWj¡1)£jAij equations and (jWj¡1)£jAij unknowns, and strong full
rank assures that the coefﬁcient matrix has full rank. Therefore, the system has a
solution.
Choose (˜ v; ˜ w) to satisfy all the constraints of the LP problem for (a; ˜ l;d), let
vw
i = ¡ ˜ vi
åw2Wlw
i
, and ww
i (y) = ¡
˜ wi(y)
åw2Wlw
i
+zw
i (y). Since l ¢v = ˜ l ¢ ˜ v, it sufﬁces to
show that this (v;w) satisﬁes all the constraints of the LP problem for (~ a;l;d).
(We can ignore the adding-up constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint
for player j , i, as strong full rank holds.) Note that
(1¡d)gw
i (ai;a¡i)+dp(ai;a¡i)¢ww
i
=(1¡d)gw
i (ai;a¡i)+dp(ai;a¡i)¢
µ
zw
i ¡
1
åw2Wlw
i
˜ wi(y)
¶
=(1¡d)gw
i (ai;a¡i)+(1¡d)
µ
¡
˜ gi(ai;a¡i)
åw2Wlw
i
¡gw
i (ai;a¡i)
¶
¡
dp(ai;a¡i)¢ ˜ wi
åw2Wlw
i
=¡
(1¡d)˜ gi(ai;a¡i)+dp(ai;a¡i)¢ ˜ wi
åw2Wlw
i
· ¡
˜ vi
åw2Wlw
i
= vw
i
for all ai 2 Ai with equality if ai 2 suppai. Here, the second equality comes from
(9), and the inequality comes from the fact that (˜ v; ˜ w) satisﬁes the constraints of
the LP problem for (a; ˜ l;d). Therefore, this (v;w) satisﬁes constraints (i) and
(ii). Also,
l ¢w(y) = å
w2W
lw
i ww
i (y) = å
w2W
lw
i
µ
zw
i (y)¡
˜ wi(y)
åw2Wlw
i
¶
= ¡ ˜ wi(y) · ¡˜ vi = l ¢v:
Here, the third equality comes from (10) and the inequality comes from the fact
that (˜ v; ˜ w) satisﬁes the constraints of the LP problem for (a; ˜ l;d). Therefore, this
(v;w) satisﬁes constraint (iii). Q.E.D.
45It follows from Claims 3 and 4 and ˜ gj(a) = ¡åw2Wlw
i gw
j (a) that
k¤(l) ¸ sup
a
˜ k¤(a; ˜ l) = ¡min
a¡i
max
ai
˜ gi(ai;a¡i)
= ¡min
a¡i
max
ai
¡l ¢g(ai;a¡i) = max
a¡i
min
ai
l ¢g(ai;a¡i):
On the other hand, Claim 2 shows that k¤(l) · maxa¡iminail ¢g(ai;a¡i). There-
fore, k¤(l) = maxa¡iminail ¢g(ai;a¡i).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 24
Lemma 24. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank.
Then for each l 2 L6S
L7, k¤(l) = maxa l ¢g(a).
The proof consists of a series of claims.
Claim 5. Let l 2 L6, and let i 2 I be such that (lw
i )w2W , 0. Then
(a) there is q¤
i 2 Qi such that qi(w) = q¤
i for all w such that lw
i > 0; and
(b) for each j , i, there is q¤
j 2 Qj that contains all w such that lw
i , 0.
Let l 2 L7. Then
(c) for each i 2 I, there is q¤
i 2 Qi that contains all w such that lw
j , 0 for
some j , i; and
(d) this q¤
i contains all w such that lw
i > 0.
Proof. For part (a), suppose not, so that there are w0 2 W and w00 , w such that
qi(w0) , qi(w00), lw0
i > 0, and lw00
i > 0. Then l < L6, as for l to be in L6,
qi(w0) = qi(w00) for all w0 2 W and w00 , w satisfying lw0
i > 0 and lw00
i > 0. A
contradiction.
For part (b), suppose that there are w0 2 W and w00 , w0 such that qj(w0) ,
qj(w00), lw0
i ,0, and lw00
i ,0. Then l <L6, as for l to be in L6, qj(w0)=qj(w00)
for all j , i, w0 2 W, and w00 , w satisfying lw0
i , 0 and lw00
i , 0. A contradiction.
For part (c), suppose that there are (j;w0) and (l;w00) such that j , i, l , i,
qi(w0) , qi(w00), lw0
j , 0, and lw00
l , 0. Then l < L7, as the last condition of the
46deﬁnition of L7 requires that qi(w0) = qi(w00) for all i 2 I, w0 2 W, and w00 , w0
such that lw0
j , 0 for some j , i and lw00
l , 0 for some l , i. A contradiction.
For part (d), suppose that there are i 2 I and w0 2 W such that lw0
i > 0 and
w < q¤
i . Let (j;w00) be such that j , i and lw00
j , 0. Then from part (c), w00 2 q¤
i ,
so that qi(w00)= q¤
i ,qi(w0). This implies that l < L7, as the last condition of the
deﬁnition of L7 requires that qi(w0) = qi(w00) for all i 2 I, w0 2 W, and w00 , w0
such that lw0
i > 0 and lw00
j , 0 for some j , i. A contradiction. Q.E.D.
Claim 6. Suppose the monitoring structure is known, and let l 2 L6S
L7. Then
foreach~ a =((a
qi
i )qi2Qi)i2I, k¤(~ a;l)·l ¢g(aq¤
)whereq¤ ischosenasinClaim
5 and aq¤
= (a
q¤
i
i )i2I.
Proof. Choose (v;w) to satisfy constraints (i) through (iii) in the LP problem as-
sociated with (~ a;l;d) for some d 2 (0;1). It follows from constraint (ii) that
vw
i ¸ (1¡d)gw
i (ai;a
q¤
¡i
¡i )+dp(ai;a
q¤
¡i
¡i )¢ww
i
for all i 2 I, ai 2 Ai, and w 2 W such that lw
i , 0, since qj(w) = q¤
j for j , i for
such w. In particular, we have
vw
i ¸ (1¡d)gw
i (aq¤
)+dp(aq¤
)¢ww
i (11)
for all i 2 I and w 2 W such that lw
i , 0. Also, from constraint (i), we obtain
vw
i = (1¡d)gw
i (aq¤
)+dp(aq¤
)¢ww
i (12)
for all i 2 I and w 2 W such that lw
i > 0, since q(w) = q¤ for such w 2 W. It
follows from (11) and (12) that
l ¢v ·å
i2I å
w2W
lw
i
h
(1¡d)gw
i (aq¤
)+dp(aq¤
)¢ww
i
i
=(1¡d)l ¢g(aq¤
)+d å
y2Y
py(aq¤
)l ¢w(y):
Using constraint (iii),
l ¢v · (1¡d)l ¢g(aq¤
)+d å
y2Y
py(aq¤
)l ¢v = (1¡d)l ¢g(aq¤
)+dl ¢v:
Subtracting dl ¢v from both sides and dividing by (1¡d), we get l ¢v · l ¢
g(aq¤
). Therefore, k¤(~ a;l;d) · g(aq¤
). Q.E.D.
47Claim 7. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank. Let
l 2 L6. Then k¤(l) ¸ maxa l ¢g(a).
Proof. Let a 2 argmaxa0l ¢g(a0). Without loss of generality we can assume that
a is a pure action proﬁle, so that we denote it by a. In what follows, we show that
k¤(a;l) ¸ l ¢g(a).
Let l 2 L6, and let (i;w0) be such that lw0
i > 0. Consider the LP problem
associated with (a;l;d). Note that we can ignore constraints (i) and (ii) for j , i,
as (lw
j )w2W = 0.
Let vw
i = gw
i (a) for each w 2 W. For w , w0, let (ww
i (y))y2Y be such that
gw
i (a) = (1¡d)gw
i (a0
i;a¡i)+dp(a0
i;a¡i)¢ww
i (y) (13)
for all a0
i 2 Ai. Also, let
ww0
i (y) =
1
lw0
i
Ã
l ¢g(a)¡ å
w,w0
lw
i ww
i (y)
!
(14)
for all y 2Y.
Weclaimthatthis(v;w)satisﬁesconstraints(i)through(iii)intheLPproblem.
First, constraints (i) and (ii) hold for w ,w0, since (13) holds. Also, as in the proof
of Claim 4, we have
(1¡d)gw0
i (a0
i;a¡i)+dp(a0
i;a¡i)¢ww0
i (y)
= gw0
i (a)+(1¡d)
l ¢g(a0
i;a¡i)¡l ¢g(a)
lw0
i
· gw0
i (a)
for all a0
i 2 Ai with equality if a0
i = ai. Here, the inequality is from the fact that
a maximizes argmaxl ¢g(a0) and lw0
i > 0. This shows that constraints (i) and
(ii) hold for w0. Finally, constraint (iii) follows from (14). Thus we conclude
k¤(a;l) ¸ åw2Wlw
i vw
i = l ¢g(a), as desired. Q.E.D.
Claim 8. Suppose the monitoring structure is known and has strong full rank. Let
l 2 L7. Then for each a, k¤(a;l) ¸ l ¢g(a).
Proof. Let l 2 L7, and given this l, let l(i;w)(j;w0) be a direction such that the
components for (i;w) and (j;w0) are equal to those of l and the remaining com-
ponents are zero. (Thus the direction l(i;w)(j;w0) has at most two non-zero compo-
nents.) In order to prove the claim, it sufﬁces to show that a is enforceable with
48respect to the hyperplane orthogonal to l at g(a). This enforceability follows
from the following two facts: (i) If the monitoring structure has strong full rank,
then a is enforceable with respect to the hyperplane orthogonal to l(i;w)(j;w0) at
g(a) for each (i;w) and (j;w0) such that i , j (but possibly w = w0), lw
i , 0, and
lw0
j , 0. (ii) a is enforceable with respect to the hyperplane orthogonal to l at
g(a) if a is enforceable with respect to the hyperplane orthogonal to l(i;w)(j;w0)
at g(a) for each (i;w) and (j;w0) such that i , j, lw
i , 0, and lw0
j , 0. Note that
(i) follows from Lemma 5.4 of FLM, since here we assume that the monitoring
structure does not depend on w. Likewise, (ii) follows from Lemma 5.3 of FLM,
since l 2 L7 implies that for each (i;w) such that lw
i , 0, there is (j;w0) such
that i , j and lw0
j , 0. Q.E.D.
The statement of Lemma 24 follows from Claims 6, 7, and 8.
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